

SRI MADHWACHARYA.

A SKETCH OF

HIS LIFE AND TIMES

BY

C. N. KRISHNASWAMI AIYAR, M. A.

AND

HIS PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

BY

S. SUBBA RAU, M. A.

SECOND EDITION

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
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BY T. RAJAGOPALACHARIAR, M.A., B.L.

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

IN bringing out a second edition of "The Life and Times of Sri Madhwacharya," the publishers have availed themselves of the opportunity to make the treatment of the subject fuller by the addition of a critical estimate of "The Philosophy of Madhwacharya" by Mr. S. Subba Rau, M. A. It is hoped that the present edition in its improved form will command a wide circulation.

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PART II.—Philosophy.

SRI MADHWA AND MADHWISM.

CHAPTER I.

1.—INTRODUCTORY.

THE present state of Indian History being what it is, no apology seems needed for historic sketches, however humble their scope, so long as the subject treated of is comparatively unfamiliar. That it is so in the case of the Teacher, whose life it is here proposed to sketch, it is not hard to show.

For in South India, from the seventh century onwards, if not earlier, there have been hundreds of saints and religious reformers labouring for the progress of ‘Protestant Hinduism,’ and leaving more or less of tangible results behind. Of these, however, Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhwa, have had the special distinction of each associating his name permanently with a more or less well-known system of philosophy, in addition to the religious and semi-religious reforms their systems or the times severally called forth.

Each has had accordingly a more or less influential following, though Sankara, according to a recent estimate, has nearly seventy-five per cent. of the Hindus still owning him as their *guru*.

But the comparative and historic method of study, which for over fifty years has shown itself prominent in the West, and has still more recently been making its influence felt in our own country, does not estimate the importance of a system by the mere number of people who accept it or profess to follow it. It has got other tests and other standards to go by, and, from one point of view, all systems are alike useful for its mission. This being granted, it is rather strange that Sri Madhwa and his philosophy should thus far have received but scant attention at the hands of scholars, Western as well as Indian. Sankara and his system have, thanks to German and other European savants, as well as the Theosophic Agency, been widely studied and estimated and admired, while Ramanuja may also be assumed to have become fairly well known, though not so widely known. The South Indian Vaishnavites, at any rate, who form his chief followers, have shown themselves active in so many directions and some at least of the well-known scholars

of that community have, by means of translations and otherwise, tried to familiarise the general public with their beliefs and practices.

It is doubtful, however, so far as one is aware, if the name of Madhwa, as the Founder of an important system of philosophy, is as yet a tenth as familiar to the reader of things in general in other parts of India or even to those who claim special acquaintance with Indian thought in the West. Apparently it is not, for Max Müller once mentions it, only to brush it lightly aside, while Hunter, for instance, in his otherwise excellent account of Neo-Hinduism, does not so much as make a bare mention of Madhwa or his system among the Vaishnavite Reformers. It may be freely granted that, if the amount of following is the chief or sole index of the importance of a religious or philosophical system, Madhwaism must take its place much below the *Chaithanyaite*, *Vallabhite* or *Kabirpanthi* or other forms of North-Indian Vaishnavism. But it may well be doubted whether that is always the right kind of test in determining the intrinsic or relative worth of a system of philosophy. Any endeavour, therefore, which is meant to draw the attention of the 'comparative' student to the chief features of the Dwaita system

of philosophy as fashioned by its best exponent; as well as to the life and times of the Founder, may be assumed to need no special excuse for its making.

2.—SCOPE AND METHOD.

For these reasons the present is a small attempt at showing in outline the life and times of Sri Madhwacharya and the main features of his philosophy. It is not proposed to discuss the latter at anything like adequate length or contrast it with other systems preceding or following it, so as to assign to it its place in the history of philosophy. These must necessarily be left to much better equipped hands and to future specialists and research students. All that is meant here is to present in a general way the Teacher and his work *on strictly historical lines and for the general reader's benefit*. It is not directly addressed to the guru's followers—at any rate in the first instance—and not certainly to such of them as are strictly 'orthodox.' They need not and are not called upon to subscribe to the *rational* line, which is here deliberately adopted, and which will be strictly and scrupulously followed in the series of pamphlets meant to describe the Lives and Times of the chief gurus of India, of which this is the second.

. It may be added, however, in passing, and by way of explanation, that the chief offence to the orthodox of every sect, committed by the adoption of Rationalism in religious matters, is the rejection among others of *miracles* popularly so-called—those supernatural incidents which gather round the memory of every great person by the efforts of enemies as well as friends, and which are addressed primarily to the vulgar and the credulous, and are meant to ‘magnify’ the founder in their eyes. The intelligent reader will easily analyse some of these and find that they all run in certain common grooves, the most marvellous and astounding among them concerning themselves as a rule with the sternest facts in every man’s life—his birth and exit. Now the historic presentation consistently and deliberately rejects miracles, for the simple reason that ‘what is history cannot be supernatural, and what is supernatural cannot be history.’

At the same time, the rationalistic and historic spirit does not run-a-muck and absolutely exclude the ‘heroic’ nature of great men of thought or action. It will therefore be found that, in narrating the ‘story’ of Madhwa’s life, his claim to originality is fully conceded, while at the same time

some account is also taken of the somewhat vague notions—discomforting doubts of hitherto accepted doctrines—which were prevalent at or before the time of his advent, and which assuredly had prepared the way for the acceptance of his message.

3.—SOURCES.

In the absence of any contemporary historical accounts, the lives of most of the gurus, and so of Madhwa among others, have necessarily to be extracted from other sources more or less indirect and necessarily imperfect—from their own works, if they have left any ; from the semi-mythical accounts which have come down to us in fragments, or in compilations from their own disciples or their immediate followers ; from songs, or indirect references in other quarters ; and from Sasans (inscriptions and the like) where these are available.

Now, in Sri Madhwa's case, we have undoubtedly a large collection of his own works (*vide Appendix A*) at our disposal. The present writer, however, does not pretend to have studied any of them—at any rate in the original—in the historic or any other spirit. He, therefore, ventures to hope that the enlightened among his followers will undertake it as a labour of love,

and add to the historic interpretation of the guru's teachings, though for purposes of his life, it is to be feared that no material addition can be made from this source, this kind of literature being necessarily philosophic and impersonal.*

Next there are two compilations professing to tell the story of the guru's life and work. These are *Madhwa Vijaya* and *Manimanjari*—two compilations in verse—proceeding from Pundit Narayana Acharya, son of Pundit Thrivikrama Acharya, one of the greatest of Madhwa's converts. It need hardly be said that these are more puranic than historic, and, being composed in a thoroughly orthodox spirit, require very careful handling for historic purposes. But such as they are, they form the main basis of this sketch because it is a case of that or none.

The learned Appayya Dikshit is known to have subjected Sri Madhwa's philosophy to some critical examination, but it is not within the reach of the present writer, and after all it is not likely to help historic aims very much, for the Dikshit lived long after the Teacher himself and his

* Mr. Subba Rao of Salem has recently published translations of *Sutra Bhashya* and the commentaries of the *Bhagavad Gita*. The latter has a sketch of the guru's life but necessarily of the orthodox kind.

object was to criticise the philosophy, not to write of the philosopher, and his methods were anything but historic.

Sasans and inscriptions have yet to come to light, with perhaps the sole exception of one single epigraphic contribution of an inscription at *Sri Kurman* relating to Swami Narahari Thirtha, from which one is able to limit the field of conjecture relating to the time of Sri Madhwa's existence and labours in our midst. Some day we may expect the *muts* to discover documents of high historic value, but the day is not yet.

In these circumstances the reader hardly needs to be cautioned against the imperfections attending an attempt of this kind and the provisional nature of most of the 'conclusions' arrived at. He only needs reminding that, in presenting what facts and conclusions have become available to the writer, *he has been studiously keeping the historic view of them throughout* and has not deliberately chosen to go out of it.



CHAPTER II.

1.—THE LAND OF THE GURU'S BIRTH.

The land of the Guru's birth combines all the rare physical beauties of Western Coast Districts and its people have long been remarkable for their fine build and high intelligence. In our own day the Mangaloreans have distinguished themselves in many walks of life and their women form the best educated on our side. ,

It was about the middle of the eighth century after Christ that this land of *Tuluva*, now comprising the Canaras more or less, is believed to have received a fresh wave of Brahmin immigrants with whom this narrative is immediately concerned. They are known to have been invited by the Vanavasi Kadamba King, Mayura Varman. They were followers of Kumarila Bhatta in the main, that is, upholders of the *Karma Marga* as established by the *Purva Mimamsa* School of Jaimini. Bhatta, it need hardly be stated, is now familiar to the schoolboy as the most successful and relentless of the persecutors of Buddhism in Northern India, though the day may come

when, through the kind offices of research, he will cease to occupy that bad eminence to which his friends and his enemies have both conspired to raise him !

These Bhatta immigrants, however, soon embraced in the next generation the system of Sri Sankara, who had established a *mutt* at Sringeri, on the Tungabhadra, from which energetic apostolic successors were spreading his faith in all directions.

For upwards of five hundred years *Adwaitism* and the practices associated therewith had been spreading and driving their roots apparently without violence or tumult in every province of India, till at length the faith could claim more than ninety per cent. of the people of India. Even now, as has been noted already, according to a recent calculation, it includes about seventy-five per cent. of the Hindus ; at the time of which we are writing, therefore, it must have included more, for there have since been schisms from it in the shape of Vaishnavite and other sects, which have drawn away large numbers of people from its ranks.

2.—THE STATE OF SANKARA'S SYSTEM.

But Sankara's system, like every other system that the world has seen, had undoubtedly

had weak points about it, which, though hid from men's gaze in its morning splendour, had silently grown with its growth and had begun to discover many ugly features, the worst of which bore indirectly or otherwise on character. Pundit Narayana notes some of them, though he is more vehement on the doctrinal side of the evil—perhaps because he regarded them, as Paul III. did, parents of the other. “The doctors of the dominant theology had grown turbulent,”* we are told, “and were proclaiming from the house-tops that phenomena were unreal, that the Lord is no Person and has no (righteous) attributes, that souls were undifferentiated and so forth.. Several pious people had begun to feel dissatisfied with the prevalent philosophy and its influence on character. The shades of False Theology had obscured the Sun of Truth,” † and a vague and new tune was haunting the ears of some thousands of the Canara people and of the adjoining districts. This tune it was given to Sri Madhwa ‘to set to music.’

We learn incidentally that Sankara's was only

* नैर्गुण्यवादिषु जेन्ज्वपि साप्रहेषु । M. V.

† विज्ञानंभानुमति कालवलेन लीने । M. V.

one of the twenty-one chief heretical systems then in existence. The names of these are given by more than one Madhwa writer, but in no recognised order—neither logical nor chronological. But twenty out of twenty-one, apparently needed but little trouble to brush them aside, so that the one system which Madhwa had to oppose with all his might was Sankara's, in doing which accordingly he has employed special methods and special care, as will be detailed later on, and has set himself to condemn not only his philosophy in incidental and formal ways, but his personality as well, after the manner familiar enough to the student of religious history—after the manner, for instance, of the Catholics in the case of Luther.

One of these special methods was a new doctrine which was formed by the *guru* and definitely mentioned in his *Bharata Thathparya Nirnaya*, and reproduced with additions and embellishments by Pandit Narayana in his *Madhwa Vijaya*, and, in a special manner, in *Manimanjari*. Stated in the beaten way, then, the cause of the *avatar* of Madhwa was this :—

The *Dytias*, being eternal enemies of Vishnu, had received repeated beatings at the hands of the Lord, whenever they presumed to trouble

His people—as, for instance, in connection with His avatars of Nrisimha, Rama and Krishna. Vayu, the son of Vishnu, had on every one of these occasions, appeared in the flesh along with his Father—as Hanuman helping Rama, and as Bhima carrying out the wishes of Krishna and so forth. On this latter occasion, he had slain a dyutia, Maniman by name, (a story which may be read in the *Aranya Parva*), who, having thus been baffled in physical fighting, had for long been plotting to create a secession among the people of Vishnu. At length, having been armed with the necessary weapons by Siva, whom he had pleased with his penances and prayers, he entered the world as Sunkara and had, by reason of his rare dialectical skill, succeeded in spreading his false faith. The chosen of Vishnu had too long been kept steeped in ignorance and, at the request of the Devas and Brahmins, Vishnu was pleased to desire His son and servant Vayu to go down once more and gather the good and the pious in the fold and condemn the wicked. The resolution having once been made in heaven, it was made known to the people (of South Canara) in various well-known ways. On one occasion, for instance, at a festive gathering at the temple

of Udipi, the spirit of Ananteswar was upon a Brahmin and made him messenger of good news and proclaim the kingdom of heaven at hand. And it was also found, later on and after the guru had made his mark fairly well, that the Rig Veda itself had foretold the advent of the great reformer and his triumphs !

There is nothing absolutely original under the sun—no, not even in the white heat of religious rancour. The stories bear such a monotonous feature about them. For the reader has but to change the names, and he will find the story fitting a hundred other contexts equally well.

The real situation, however, was that Sankara's system had shown itself more intellectual than moral, as has been already said, and over the whole of India the wave of Bhakthi Marga was passing for some centuries—due, perhaps, among other things to Islamic activities of those days.

3.—BIRTH AND EARLY YEARS OF THE GURU.

In those days there lived in Pajaka, in the village of Belle, six miles to the south-east of Udipi, a Brahmin of the name of Madhya Geha*

* Literally, middle-house—an evident rendering into Sanskrit of the vernacular clan-name or distinctive family name.

owing some small plot of garden land and living on what could be got from cultivating it. He was well versed in the Vedas and the Vedangas and was honorably surnamed the Bhatta. He had married a beautiful and virtuous wife Vedavati by name, by whom he had had, in the course of several years, two sons and a daughter, of whom the sons had died in infancy, while the daughter was still living. The Brahmin, however, being strictly orthodox in his views, had been longing for a son 'to continue the thread of his line' and he and his wife had been moving with prayers and penances the Lord of Udipi, who was their tutelary Deity. At length, after a trial of over twelve years, the Lord was pleased to hear their prayers and bless them, and in the year 4300 of Kali Yuga, which roughly corresponds to 1199 of the Christian era, on the last day of Dasra, the wife of Madhya Geha presented him with a son. And this son became Sri Madhwa, the Founder of the Dwaita System of Philosophy.

The year of his birth is indicated by the guru himself in his *Bharata Thalparya Nirnaya* and has nearly been established by a recent epigraphic find at *Sri Kurmam*, of which mention has already been made. Mr. H. Krishna Sastry, the

finder, argues the question of the exact year in a thoroughly scientific way and reaches the conclusion that the year of the guru's birth must have been 1238 A.D. The present writer however is not prepared to regard it as conclusive, and until the chain of his argument is made more complete, is not willing to summarily reject the *sloka* referred to as an interpolation, which is what the Sastri does. For the present, then, the year of the guru's birth is 1199. But though the year is thus a matter of doubt, the month and day are quite accurately known, for *Madhwa Navami* is the first red-letter day of the Madhwa Calendar. Mr. C. M. P. Achary discusses the question at some length and believes 1238 A.D. to be the year in which the guru was born or became a *Sanyasin*! But in this discussion *Vidyasankar* is left out of account, which is not desirable, for next after the Guru himself, he is the chief actor in this 'play,' as will be shown below.

The event naturally caused the greatest rejoicing in the family. More than that, it caused rejoicing in Heaven and the Devas proclaimed success to the righteous and confusion to the wicked. The spirit of Vayu was also seen to descend from Heaven and enter the child's body!

The father blessed the name of the Lord and called the child Vasudeva, and the child grew up and was the joy of his parents and friends. Orientals are, as a rule, precocious and Vasudeva gave indications from childhood onwards of a glorious future. Miracles necessarily formed part of them, of which a sample or two must suffice for our present purpose. The parents had taken the child to be presented to the Lord of Udipi and, as they were returning through a dense and fearful forest, an evil spirit dwelling thereabout opposed their way, but presently felt rebuked by the divine Child and went about his business, bearing testimony to the godly presence of Vayu. On another occasion, in his fifth year, the child was one day found missing and after an anxious search made everywhere for three whole days, his parents saw him again at the temple of Ananteswar at Udipi, teaching gods and men how to worship Vishnu according to the Shastras.

In due course Vasudeva was initiated into the mysteries of the alphabet and invested with the sacred string and sent to the village school to learn the chanting of the Vedas along with other boys of his age. Among these he soon distinguished himself very highly in various forms of

physical exercise and field games. He could wrestle, run, jump and swim most wonderfully—so much so that people loved to call him Bhima for his strength and agility. Perhaps it was this fact, which need not be doubted, that was after all the chief foundation of the doctrine already referred to, and what was at first mere rhetoric, was afterwards changed either silently or deliberately into logic, and sanctified later into an undoubted article of faith. Hundreds of other examples may be cited to prove that the grandest of doctrines often rest upon very simple foundations. The reader will easily call to mind the celebrated Christian doctrine of transubstantiation and, in our own land, it is in some quarters believed that the celebrity of *Dasagriva*, the ten-headed (*Ravana*), rests upon nothing more than a bit of rhetoric indicative of that chieftain's 'bull-neck'!

In his studies, properly so called, however, Vasudeva is said to have failed to give his teacher satisfaction or promise of any kind, being habitually irregular in attendance and inattentive to lessons. This statement does not agree with what has been already said about the boy's precocity, but we must suppose this to be an attempt, clumsy perhaps, but well meant, to show the divine side

of the Guru and magnify it in the eyes of the disciples. The village schoolmaster, therefore, apparently gave him up in despair and Vasudeva left school soon after, though it is not easy to say when.

The next event in his life was his renunciation, which, as we shall presently see, occurred about his twenty-fifth year, and, on this occasion, we find him styled *Purna-Pragna* in recognition of his uncommon learning in the Vedas and Vedangas. It is hard to reconcile both these statements without some connecting link. We have, therefore, to assume that, humanly speaking, Vasudeva left the village school after the usual vedic course was completed, and, for several years afterwards, had been learning the *Shastras*, i.e., logic, grammar, dialectics and the like; to what excellent purpose, the world has since known so well.

4.—THE GREAT RENUNCIATION.

But all these several years there were forces working within, which are now hid from us, but which were slowly drifting Vasudeva towards renunciation. The Pundit himself does not help us here, for he merely talks of the gods hastening him on and other vague things, which in effect amounts to saying he does not know. Whatever

the reason, however, when Vasudeva at length made up his mind to renounce, he proved himself terribly in earnest about it, sought for a *guru* to formally intitiate him and soon found him in a certain Achuthapreksha, if that is a reliable proper name. This monk, we are told, had become dissatisfied with the Vedanta he had been taught and was awaiting the advent of some man of God to reform it. How far this could have been true, we shall find later on, when his own pupil was trying to wean him from the old faith.

The act of renunciation was not easy, for the boy was the darling of his parents and, what more, their only son. It, therefore, meant that the old parents were once again to go without funeral rites—the worst lot that could befall them in the circumstances. They begged, they chid and remonstrated. But Vasudeva prophesied a younger brother for himself and having remained a 'secular' novice till it was realised in due course and his brother (Vishnuthirtha, as he came to be known long after), was born, he got at length initiated according to the Shastras and was acclaimed by the assembled people with the title of Purna Pragna. Immediately after the ceremony was over, as the young monk was 'adoring

Ananteswar, the spirit of the Lord was on one of the crowd, who turning to Achutapreksha cried out, 'My son, behold my beloved for whom thou hast been longing all the while ! He is thy guide and the means of thy salvation !'

The act of renunciation is usually placed in Vasudeva's ninth year by the orthodox—for very obvious reasons. But two or three good reasons may be adduced to prove this was much later, though thereby it is not meant to lessen the *guru's* greatness any way. It may be said once for all that the greatness of Sri Madhwa, like the greatness of other persons of his class, does not depend on these frail crutches, but rests on the solid foundation of the work he has done.

Now, in the first place, the Pundit mentions the occurrence of a festival immediately after this renunciation, which looks most like the *Mahamakham* celebrated once every twelve years at Kumbakonam. The period of twelve years is calculated on the motions of the planet Jupiter, and its latest celebration was in 1897. Tradition among Madhwas connects the institution of this festival at Kumbakonam with the name of Ma lhwa, and there is nothing to point against it. If then he had established a festival of this kind, he must

have modelled it on what was obtaining at Udipi in that connection. This conclusion may be asserted without fear of contradiction, if the festival had been kept up still at Udipi, but unfortunately it is not—worse than that, no one remembers its ever having been done there in the past, so that all tracing it to its right source has now become impossible. It is some small consolation that there is still a festival of the kind observed at a shrine in South Canara called *Vijasthala*.

If, therefore, we agree to take this occurrence for a fact, and calculate backwards, it reduces the *guru's* age at the time of the renunciation to either thirteen or twenty-five. The writer prefers taking the latter, for, as has been already said, Vasudeva had by the time he renounced, not only mastered his training in the Vedas and Vedangas, but had also been waiting for some years to please his parents, who described themselves as old and past all hopes of child-bearing. There is, therefore, every likelihood of its proving the right time, if we agree that Vasudeva renounced in his twenty-fifth year and became a monk to be known from that time by the name of *Purna-Pragna*.

The dedication of his life hereby to the study and realisation of Vedanta soon brought his vigorous dialectical and logical powers to the front and the old Sankarite Vedantism of Achutapreksha failed to satisfy him. He saw weak points in it at every step and, unconsciously perhaps at first, but slowly and surely, he was drifting towards opposition. While it was yet in its earlier stages, he had had on several occasions to argue with his own guru, who had been nourished in the old faith, and often to carry discussion to unpleasant lengths. But the fame of his discourses soon spread and the young monk's strong convictions and great originality began to be noised abroad in the neighbourhood and his presence felt in many different ways.

Some time after his learning had made him a worthy recipient thereof, Achutapreksha was glad to promote him to the first rank of monkhood and instal him, as the Pundit says, *Ruler of the Kingdom of Vedanta*, which in all likelihood means, make him Head of the *mutt* he was ruling till then. On this occasion he received the name of *Ananda Thirtha*, the name by which he styles himself in all his writings. This position gave him the first place among the monks at the *mutt*.

attached to Ananteswar, and for some years they all lived exercising themselves in prayers and penances, study, disputations and the other duties enjoined on the order.



CHAPTER III.

1.—THE GURU'S SOUTHERN TOUR.

The Deccan in those days was, as we know, split up into a number of kingdoms of varying sizes and importance, mostly independent, too often hostile and intriguing. Several names of such kingdoms and rulers have been unearthed and gathered together by the labours of Archaeologists. But, whatever their other defects, the chiefs were, as a rule, all professing patronage to learning, such as it then was. Occasionally there were specialists gracing particular courts, such, for instance, as *Vignanesvara*. But the bulk of the Pundits were, as a rule, 'generalists' and were able to discourse, loudly, if not always profitably, on 'the sciences' in general, and the Vedanta in particular. And in an age of incessant wars, troubles and insecurity, the most pleasing feature of the Indian land undoubtedly was, that it was easy and possible for men of learning to travel from court to court with the express purpose of beating opponents at the dialectical tournaments and *melées*, with which kings and chiefs loved to

amuse themselves, and of winning sonorous titles and tangible rewards. The reader may, if he likes, feast his ears with a few specimen titles like ‘*Tharkapanchanana*,’ ‘*Vadi Simha*,’ ‘*Prativadi Bhayankara*,’ and the like still surviving in odd corners. The discourses were usually dry as dust and academic, except when on occasions it was a case of Buddhist or Jain persecution, when a ghastly interest attached to it, where men were driven to argue with the noose of Zaleukos thrown about their necks, and an angry and clamourous multitude were eager to decide questions on other grounds than their merits. Readers of the lives of saints in all lands will easily recollect cases where miracles of a sort too often decided for or against a party. Madhwa, as we may hereafter agree to call Ananda Thirtha, though for reasons not well known, had, during these quiet years, come across many such peripatetic knights of learning and had learned to recognise his superiority and to habitually oppose the essentials of the old faith.

At length, sure of holding his own in controversies Madhwa set out for a tour through the southern districts of South India. We learn that just before doing it, he managed to make his peace with

his father. This evidently means that the wrath, which had inflamed poor Madhya Geha on the occasion of his son's proposed renunciation, because all his entreaties had failed to shake Madhwa's resolve, had not cooled down until several years after, and not until the rising fame of the young monk had justified his choice, and he was tempted to exclaim, as the father of another seemingly unpromising son did in profane history, 'after all the booby has some sense ! '

Accompanied by Achutapreksha and others, Madhwa went south and stopped at Vishnumangalam. This town which lies twenty-seven miles South of Mangalore, we shall meet in this sketch once more in a later context. Here occurred one of those miracles which delight his devout followers most, and which connect him with Bhima in one of his 'tremendous' aspects. The reader will remember the highly delightful story of the Pandu hero's encounter with the Asura Baka and his eating with ease the 'monster' dinner which had been prepared for him, and which had been entrusted into his hands to be taken to the monster. What we have in *Madhwa Vijia* is but a tame version-

-of this story, and Madhwa is said to have satisfied his hosts by this exhibition of his Bhima nature. A dozen times or so he eats fairly 'monstrous' dinners, but the more miraculous part of the story is where we find him doing the very opposite of it, namely, 'multiplying loaves' to meet the needs of his party in the midst of wildernesses. The reader will again think of the story of Krishna eating the only grain of rice which Draupadi could find for him on a rather serious occasion in the period of the exile of the Pandus, of which this is perhaps a distorted and tame version.

2.—THE INCIDENT AT TRIVANDRUM.

The next important halt was made at Trivandrum and here it was, in all likelihood, that an event occurred which has served since as a turning point in the history of Madhwaism. We saw that Madhwa was till now only engaged in controverting individual articles of the monistic faith and baffling the average champions of that faith whom he happened to meet, by his pitiless logic and cross-questioning. From this desirable attitude of healthy enquiry and research, Madhwa felt bound to turn, after what occurred here, and discover, now and ever afterwards, an attitude of uncompromising hostility and loathing towards

The person of Sankara, his system and his followers. What in reality it was that occurred, we cannot tell, for we have only the evidence of a partisan, who was not himself an eye-witness to it, and who is evidently desirous to show his own side to the best advantage. But even he finds it hard to dismiss it in the easy and beaten way in which other controversies are brushed aside and, reading between the lines, therefore, we are not perhaps wrong in concluding that there was a disputation held here before the King, according to the custom obtaining in such cases; that it was between Madhwa and the then incumbent of the Sringeri mutt who had chanced to be there touring on his own account; that Madhwa was not able to silence his opponent as speedily or effectively here, as he is said to have done elsewhere; and that the disputants parted in anger and ill-will and smarting under the injury thus caused to his reputation, Madhwa bore ever afterwards deadly enmity to the triumphant rival and treated him and his triumph in the way familiar to us in religious controversies; pretty much, that is, as the early Christians treated the Romans and the Pagans generally, when they became the objects of relentless persecution at their hands; or as the Protestants looked upon Philip and his agents.

The Pundit calls this monk of Sringeri *Sankara* (with a slight modification of the first letter, made in the worst of tastes), and, though that great *guru* had lived and laboured six or seven centuries earlier, coolly asks us to believe he had come down again to secure a dialectical victory over Madhwa. At the same time, he gives us a rare glimpse of this person, for he calls अपूर्णशुनत्तेष्वद् him 'the dwarf with the honorific affix *new*', which being interpreted is, that he bore the name of Sankara, with a well-known decoration अभिनव or some other adjective like it prefixed to it. We are naturally curious to learn more about this dwarfish monk, who was in the main instrumental in making Madhwa's attitude towards the faith and person of Sankara into one of eternal hostility. But unluckily neither *Madhwa Vijiya* nor *Manimanjari* throws further light on him.

There is, however, a list of Sankara's successors furnished by the Sringeri *mutt*, though it is manifestly incomplete and imperfect. We have nevertheless the rare luck to find in it the name of *Vidya Sankar*, who is said to have occupied the seat between 1228 A.D. and 1333 A.D. The latter is worthless, for it would give *Vidya Sankar*

a pontificate of a hundred and five years ! We, therefore, reject it. But the year 1228 is very important, for, among other things, it settles the time of Madhwa's Southern tour, if not his age at the time of renunciation. Vidya Sankar having been installed in 1228, the tour of Madhwa must only have occurred sometime after that event, when probably that monk was also making his first tour about his ' diocese ' which, to this day, includes Trivandrum.

The rise of bad blood here, under circumstances mentioned, and the accidental coincidence of the names of his adversary and of the Founder of Adwaitism, therefore showed itself in the formation of the Bhima-Maniman theory, shaped and fortified during the guru's own life-time and embellished and added to by the zeal of his successors. This conclusion becomes all the more probable when it is remembered that, in addition to this occurrence at Trivandrum, Madhwa and his followers were for many years afterwards, being persecuted and annoyed in various ways by the followers of the dominant faith, a few of which will be found in their proper contexts later on.

The addition of *Vidya* to the name of Sankar gives point to this argument, for it indicates the

Swami's great learning in Adwaitism and accounts for the tough fighting and the unpleasant ending of the controversy at Trivandrum. So that it may now be taken as good as proved that the parties to this dispute were in very truth Vidya Sankar and Madhwa and that the result of the dispute was a turning point in the genesis of Madhwaism.

The ill-will originating at Trivandrum was further intensified by a second collision at Rameswar, where for four months or more 'the wicked dogs kept howling at his gates, while the lion within very properly refused to be drawn out or disturbed by them.'

Then the guru travelled to Srirangam and along the banks of the Palar back to Udipi.

3.—THE NET RESULT OF THE TOUR.

The account we have of some of the controversies of Madhwa in this tour tallies wonderfully with what we learn from other sources regarding the general characteristics of disputations in those days. They are mere 'academics' and touch on abstruse philosophic questions, on which the last word could never be said. One sample will suffice. The Pundits 'somewhere on the bank of the Palar,' probably Conjeeveram, desired to try Madhwa's powers of exposition and taking advant

age of a casual remark of his, that it was possible to interpret the *Srutis* in three ways, the *Maha-bharata* in ten ways and each of the *Thousand Names of Vishnu* in a hundred different ways, they challenged him to interpret the first of the Names *Visva*, in a hundred ways, tempting him and meaning to trap him. But he knew their hearts and took up the challenge with alacrity and with the help of rules relating to the use of prefixes and suffixes, began to expound the meanings connected by the term *Visva* in such a terrific manner that, before he had done with half a dozen, the Pundits felt dazed and stunned, and earnestly besought him to desist, owning his divinity without question as well as their own littleness !

The net result of the tour was Madhwa's perception of his own greatness and the widening of the breach between him and the head priest of the Sringeri mutt. Accordingly soon after his return, he wrote his commentary on the Bhagavad Gita, which set forth incidentally the essentials of his faith and formed the prelude to the composition of the guru's commentaries of the Vedanta Sutras, and the formal proclamation of his faith later on.



CHAPTER IV.

1. THE GURU'S NORTHERN TOUR.

The next event in his life was the tour through Hindustan, but it must have occurred several years after his return to Udipi from the south. For, in the first place, the greatest of his works, namely the commentaries of the Vedanta Sutras, is found finished by the time Madhwa reached Benares. But as we have found that Madhwa's progress till now had been but gradual and slow, starting from objections to stray points and ending in the commentaries of the Gita, we shall not be wrong in allotting some few years to the composition of this sheet-anchor of every faith—the commentaries of the Sutras. We may, therefore, take it that the actual composition of the work was done at Udipi during a fairly long interval, and that it was revised and received its touches later in the light of the criticisms it had had at Benares, the centre of learning at all times.

Again, among the incidents connected with this tour, mention is made of a certain King *Isivard Deva* in Maharashtra, who tried to impress

Madhwa and party into his service—apparently in connection with the building of some dam or fashioning a canal. The King, of course, smarted for it, for the spirit was upon him and, having bidden the Guru to work, he found at the close of the day that he had been unconsciously working for him the whole day !

Putting miracle on one side, however, we may try to examine this proper name and we find among the Yadava chiefs of Devagiri, there was a king of the name of *Mahadeva*, who reigned from 1260 A.D. to 1271 A.D. The names are identical and the use of the one for the other is a well-known poetical shift. We have seen that the Guru's tour through the Southern Districts could not have occurred earlier than 1228 A.D., and we may, therefore, now agree that the northern tour could not have occurred earlier than 1260 A.D., and for a similar reason. The interval though long, was surely not too long for the preparation of the commentaries of the Vedanta Sutras, which is, as has been said, the sheet-anchor of every system of Vedanta Philosophy. And there were doubtless other works composed about this time, as occasion demanded.

2. DIFFICULTY OF TOURING IN THOSE TIMES.

The events connected with this tour seem to have been recorded by an eye-witness, from whom Pundit Narayana professes to have borrowed his version. Read carefully, we discover many interesting facts about the state of the country in those days. Wild beasts infested the roads, and gangs of dacoits, wilder than beasts. Many of the miracles were accordingly the shifts of the Guru to extricate himself and party from these dangers. Rivers were unfordable or impassable, and it required much skill on the part of the Guru to effect his purpose. On one such occasion we have the well-known miracle of walking across a sheet of water 'without wetting the cloth.' Chiefs were sometimes neutral, sometimes hostile. They had to be coaxed or evaded. All the originality of the guru was needed on such occasions. One instance given by the Pundit is of rare value. It shows the difference between the apostolic successors of Madhwa and his own self in a striking manner. In the course of his travels, it happened that on some occasions Madhwa met hostile Mahomedan chiefs, whom, however, he found it possible

and desirable to pacify by means of conciliatory speeches made, as the Pundit adds, *in their own language*—that is in Urdu or Persian. Just so. For Madhwa, as the founder of a new system, had necessarily had to learn other systems, and, in practical matters, to deal with people in sensible ways, and understand the secret that ‘the nearest road to a man’s heart lies through the tongue.’ So, whatever use he might make of the term ‘*Mlechcha*’ for dialectical purposes, he had had no scruple to deal with them in person and hold concourse with them to effect his purposes. The present day Gurus, on the other hand, the *Swamis*, that is, those that occupy the *mulls* everywhere in India, are much diviner beings than their founders, for, so far from learning *Mlechcha* languages, or indeed learning anything at all that may do them or others good, they shut themselves up as a rule, and when they find they must stir out, do it with all manner of absurd precautions; and if, as ill-luck would have it, they chance to meet the gaze of a *Mlechcha*[“]walking the road, they must needs fast the whole day and make gifts of milch cows to purify themselves ! !

At Goa, it appears, the Guru had actually to save himself and party by flight.

Of all the troubles which attended the tour, however, one of the most annoying seems to have been the angularities of his own 'immediate' disciples—those who were doing him personal service and were, therefore, most intimate with him. They were apparently a wild set of Canara Brahmins, with thick heads and stalwart limbs. The other miracles which they had witnessed having apparently failed to touch their hearts, the Guru had to prove his Bhima nature to them by actual wrestling with them jointly and severally and 'flooring' them all with ease !

3. THE GURU AT HARDWAR : THE SUTRA BHASHYA.

In this manner Madhwa reached Hardwar, where he stayed and passed a number of days in fasting, silence and contemplation, and then left all alone for 'the abode of Vyasa'—the Himalayan Badari or some wilderness adjoining. Here he remained some time, nobody knowing anything of his movements. The Pundit, of course, talks of the Guru's unwillingness to go back to the mortal world, for it had all become rotten at that time and of his hesitation 'to throw sacrificial rice before dogs'; as well as Vyasa's encouragement asking him to go, because there were still people left in the world who deserved and desired salvation. This in all probability means that the Guru began *proclaiming* his faith only after much hesitation and prolonged mental struggle.

Having made up his mind, however, he returned to Hardwar 'like unto the Prince of the monkeys after the memorable crossing of the sea,' and began fearlessly proclaiming the supreme Godhead of Vishnu and published his most enduring work, the commentaries of the Vedanta Sutras—the terror of all rival systems

and the glory of Narayana, and preaching his faith wherever he went, he returned slowly, stopping at Kalyan, the metropolis of the Chalukya Empire and the natural resort of Pundits in those days. Here he made his first great conversion, that, namely, of an eminent rival *Sobhanabhatta* by name, who, as has been noted, succeeded the Guru after his departure and became head of the mutt, whose branches* at the present day claim the allegiance of the bulk of the Madhwas.

4. BACK TO UDIPI—MINOR REFORMS.

On his return to Udipli Madhwa's first business was to convert his own Guru Achutapreksha. Though we were told on a former occasion he was one of those who had become dissatisfied with the

* The succession list usually given is as follows:—
Sri Madhwacharya.

|
Padmanabha Thirtha alias Sobhanabhatta.

|
Narabari Thirtha.

|
Madhava Thirtha.

|
Akshobhyia Thirtha.

|
Jaya Thirtha (Scholiast of Madhwa's commentaries),

|
Vidyathi Raja.

|—————
Vyasa Raya mutt. Uttaradi mutt. Sumatindra mutt.

faith in which he had been brought up, the account of his conversion given here seems to point to a different state of things altogether. For, Madhwa had to repeat his arguments refuting the faith of Sankara over and over to him, and when that course failed to convince Achuthapreksha, he had to add *the terror of his voice*, and anathemas in case of further persistence, before the Guru's mind could be purged of all heresy !

As conversions multiplied and new questions presented themselves for solution, the Guru made a number of changes, though perhaps not all of them reforms. The branding on the shoulders with the arms of Vishnu, already adopted by Ramanuja was declared necessary according to Shastras, though the way in which it is now done—under which the Madhwa men and women are branded every time that the head of their *mutt* makes his 'visitation,'—is perhaps a novelty introduced after Madhwa's time. The founding of the temple at Udipi in honor of Krishna was meant to unify and concentrate the interests of his followers and, to this day, most of the orthodox Madhwas manage to go to Udipi once at least in their lives. The prohibition of bloodshed in connection with sacrifices (of which

more hereafter) was, however, a reform of no small consequence for which the societies for the prevention of cruelty (and torture) to animals and those that feel with it, might truly feel grateful to the Guru.



CHAPTER V.

1. BEGINNINGS OF PERSECUTION.

But these changes and conversions naturally earned for the teacher a rich crop of enemies among the followers of the dominant faith and its high priests at Sringeri. The Sringeri *mutt* having long enjoyed great political influence in addition to its superiority in point of numbers on its side, we can easily imagine its attitude towards a rival so near its headquarters (Udipi is not very far from Sringeri,) proclaiming himself a prophet and denouncing the accepted doctrines. Ceaseless insults and injuries were bound to be the order of the day, especially as the new sect, besides being inferior in numbers, had as yet had no royal support under which to thrive peaceably or 'forcibly.' Maltreatment with impunity must necessarily have made the anxious eyes of the followers turn towards the Guru for remedy, and as the prospect of immediate redress of wrongs could not under the circumstances be held out, the Guru must have formulated the famous Bhima-Maniman Theory, under which the dominant sect and its founder-

became, as has been already related, the eternal enemies of the people of God, seeming to prosper for a time, but bound ultimately to be beaten by the Lord's servant.

This is the only rational conclusion which one has to draw from the narrative we have concerning the composition of a work which Madhwa was busy with at this time. It was the *Mahabharata Thathparya Nirnaya*, i.e., Exposition of the right meaning of Mahabharata.

This revision of the great epic of Vyasa was rendered necessary, we are told, inasmuch as the sage's meaning had become misunderstood and foreign matter had got mixed with the original; Madhwa is stated to have gone to the abode of Vyasa to obtain his special sanction for rewriting his work and, fortified with it, to have written the Mahabharata aright, i.e., so as to strengthen his system and confirm and sanctify the Bhima-Maniman incident, as yet without a local habitation. The general reader notes that Vyasa's special sanction was needed only in two cases—the commentaries and this Reversion. The former needed it, as a matter of course, for it was the basis of the system. Why the latter should need it, while some other works of the Guru, more important

from a doctrinal point of view, do not seem to have felt the need for it, is a question naturally suggesting itself to the curious mind and demanding an answer. It may not perhaps be altogether wrong for us to suppose that the doctrine in question, which was for the first time *formulated*, was the chief cause of the special fortification felt needed in this case.

2. THE APPROPRIATION OF THE LIBRARY.

We now come to the greatest injury the Guru sustained at the bands of the rival priests during his lifetime. More than a chapter and-a-half out of the sixteen chapters of *Madhwa Vijaya* is devoted to the narration of this incident, thereby showing its great importance. It was the forcible appropriation of the Guru's library by the head of the Sringeri *mutt*. It happened in this way.

After the encounter at Trivandrum, Vidya Sankar of Sringeri did not apparently trouble further about Madhwa, for the simple reason that the latter had not become formidable until several years after. The date of Vidya Sankar's exit given in the published list is 1333, which, we already saw, means some irregularity in the

Register, for it allots to this Swami more than a hundred years of pontificate. One or two names have clearly escaped the attention of the Sringeri mutt, and this is made clearer from what we have in *Madhwa Vijaya*. From the latter we learn that the monk who was ruling at Sringeri at this time was a *Padma Thirtha* who is said to have succeeded *Gnani Sreshtha* i. c., Vidya Sankar. This Padma Thirtha, therefore, is the missing link or one of the missing links between Vidya Sankar and Bharati Krishna, who, according to the list, succeeded the former in 1333. Vidya Sankar made his exit in peace and was succeeded by Padma Thirtha, a monk from the country of the Cholas, i.e., from the Coromandel Coast. A strong suspicion, however, attaches to this part of the story and to the name given, by reason of the startling coincidence of the name Padma Thirtha with Padmapada, the chief disciple of the great Sankara, who was also a man from the Chola land.

Padma Thirtha, or whoever else he was, saw the danger threatening the faith. The fame of Madhwa consequent on the publication of the commentaries and the conversion of Sobhana Bhatta, had begun to tell. The converts armed with the zeal natural

to them, were soon in many places actively engaged in fishing for men. It was time, therefore, that something were done to check the spread of the new faith. A Pandemonium was held at Sringeri and a plan of operation was agreed on. Smartha missionaries were to go in all directions and counteract the mischief. They were not to be very scrupulous as to the means employed in silencing heretical teaching. If calumny and other legitimate means should fail, there was His Holiness prepared to end his rival by the use of the Black Art, which he had not learned for nothing. And if even this should miscarry, they might rest assured that poison would not. The Guru, therefore, was bound to be caught somehow and despatched.

Before resorting to these extreme measures, however, Padma Thirtha sought to try the effect of taking the Guru's library away from him. We can easily understand the value of the palmleaf manuscripts in the days previous to printing and the introduction of cheap and easy writing materials. Padma Thirtha evidently believed that, if the works of the rival teacher were appropriated, the system would receive a severe blow, from which it might not easily recover.

Orders to seize hold of the manuscripts from Madhwa missionaries had already been issued to those who had been sent to counteract their work. The chief Priest, therefore, merely sought to crown the work of spoliation by laying hold of the central library and carrying the manuscripts away and burying them somewhere from which they could never more see the light. This plan once decided on was successfully carried out on the borders of the territory of King *Jaya Simha*.

This king or chief must have been connected with the *Jaya Simha*'s of the Chalukya, but of his religious bias it is not easy to say anything. He was a ruler of Kumbla, called after an old town eight miles north of Kasaragod. But his capital was at Vishnumangalam, which we have already had. The name of the capital is significant enough, but it does not enable us to say anything more than that the king was well disposed towards the new teacher. To him Madhwa applied for help and the library was through his intercession, recovered in due course. The Guru stayed at his court for some time, but the prince does not seem to have been converted, for during the rest of the teacher's life, he does not appear to have had any royal convert, the usual additions of the

present day heads of *mutts* elephants, horses palanquins and the like, which are gifts of kings and rich men, being apparently conspicuous by their absence to the last day of Madhwa.

3. LAST YEARS OF THE GURU.

It was just after the restoration of the library that the last great conversion of the Guru was made—that, namely, of Pundit Thrivikrama. His son, Pundit Narayana, from whom we have received the only original account available of the life and doings of the guru, gives us a full description of the circumstances under which his father became a convert. It is just what we have already seen in regard to Achuthapreksha, namely, that Thrivikrama had been brought up in the old faith, but had become dissatisfied with it, though he did not choose to become the follower of the new Guru until after eight days of hot discussion he had felt himself vanquished.

The fame of Thrivikrama's conversion brought in other adherents. The descendants of this Pundit are said to be still seen in South Canara or in the Cochin State territory, showing to the pious pilgrim the image of Krishna presented by Madhwa to his great disciple after his conversion. Social needs, however seem to have subsequently forced

them to go back, for they are now said to profess the old faith or call themselves at all events Smarthas.

If our surmise regarding the date of the Guru's tour to the North is correct, that is, if he had undertaken it after 1260, he must now have been preaching his faith for about fifteen years. It was at this time that, while the guru was still somewhere in King Jaya Simha's territories, that his parents died at Udupi, within a few months of each other. Madhwa's brother attended to their funeral rites, but presently after felt miserable because he had become ruined in business. vexed with the world, and now that his duty to his parents had been done, he went to his brother and persuaded him to let him have the monk's robe, which being granted he remained attached to his brother, under the name of *Vishnu Thirtha* till the day of his departure.

Madhwa seems to have spent his last years mostly in *Saridantara*, the *doab* formed by the *Kumara Dhara* and *Netravati*, writing monographs on doctrinal or practical points and sending missionaries to silence opponents. And here, on one occasion, he went to bathe in the sea in connection with an eclipse of the sun. The sea behaved

very rudely to him, but casting an angry look on it he stilled it !

The records of the Madhwa *mutts* assign to the founder seventy-nine years, six months and twenty days of *active rule*. This is clearly impossible, for it makes him live even after Allaud-din's invasion of the Dakhan in 1294. From what we have said regarding Madhwa Vijaya, it is clear that even when Pundit Narayana lived, he had only heard of the Mahomedan terror in Hindustan. We have, therefore, to suppose that the period indicated is the period of Madhwa's life. The last miracles recorded of him are those connected with his activities in *Saridantara*, as the names of places go to show. No tradition tells us as to what exactly became of him in the end, except that he disappeared one day even as he sat teaching, but his followers now believe that he rejoined Vyasa, after having desired Padmanabha Thirtha to carry on the apostolic work, and put the guardianship of the shrine of Krishna at Udupi under the care of a Board of eight others of his disciples. In the abode of Vyasa, Madhwa is still believed to remain against the beginning of a new Kalpa, when he will be rewarded with the office of Brahma (the Creator).

CHAPTER VI.

OUTLINE OF THE GURU'S FAITH.

The limits of the sketch do not allow our following the fortunes of the faith under Madhwa's successors. Like many another faith, the one *mutt* which he had left behind for propagandism, has become split up into three chief branches, with but little useful links among them. In succeeding centuries rich and royal disciples endowed each of the *mutts* liberally as they happened to belong to the one or the other. And certain well-known factors, internal and external, have brought about in them, as in every other *mutt* that one could name, a state of things, most deplorable in the interests of society and religion, and loudly calling for remedy and state intervention.

But the sketch will scarcely answer its purpose if it fails to take a bird's-eye-view of the chief features of the faith and of the chief points of difference between it and the faith standing most opposed to it, i.e., Sankara's.

The faith is Vaishnavism or *Sad Vaishnavism*, as the Madhwas love to call it, so as to distin-

guish it from the *Sri Vaishnavism* of Ramanuja. It might be viewed, like most of the Indian faiths of any importance, in its philosophical as well as practical aspects. Being founded, as all post-Buddhistic faiths are, on logic and grammar, the Dwaita Philosophy starts with a five-fold hypothesis. A belief in the *Panchabhedā*, five prime, real and eternal distinctions, is what one has to begin with. That is to say, he has to take for granted, the distinction between the Supreme Spirit and lesser spirits, between spirit and matter and so forth, even as the student of the Adwaita Philosophy has to take the existence of *Maya* or *Avidya* for granted. The Dwaita hypothesis, therefore, repudiates in unmistakable terms, the Monism of Sankara and the modified Dualism of Ramanuja. Phenomenal world, it follows, is *real and eternal* and true perception is only gained when, to use a favourite Vedantic simile, silver is seen to be silver, and not when mother of pearl is mistaken for it, in which case we see but do not perceive. The hypothesis, like so many others of its kind, may some day clash with proved scientific facts and conclusions, but human ingenuity is infinite and inconsistencies will no doubt be explained away, if people are earnest about saving the system.

. The Supreme Spirit is Vishnu or Narayana and is the Personal First Cause, the Moral and Intelligent Governor of the Universe. He and his Consort Lakshmi are real, though mysterious Persons. Brahma (the Creator) and Vayu are two of his sons. It is Vishnu that is talked of as Brahma in the Upanishads and His attributes are endless.

Souls or spirits have forms corresponding to those of animated nature in this universe and are of three classes. Those of the first class are alone destined for eternal residence in the abode of Narayana, which they enter sooner or later according to the fruit of their *karma* here below. The lesser gods, the Pitrīs (roughly corresponding to the manes of the Romans), sages, kings and a few other select classes of persons come under this head. The third class consists of those spirits that are doomed to eternal hell, towards which their sins drift them helplessly on. The enemies of Vishnu and of His people and those that doubt the revealed nature of the Vedas and sin against God and man, are among members of this group. The spirits of the middle class are destined to attain neither, but, like Sisyphus, are 'ever doing and never done,' being eternally subject to the ups and downs of *Samsara*, i. e., evils of birth and death.

2. TENETS SPECIALLY CHARACTERISTIC OF THE FAITH.

Few among the Indian faiths have cared to be so rigorously logical. The thirst for eternal peace of the troubled human soul, has indeed from very early times been solved in India, by a belief in a debtor-creditor system of Karma. The exposition of this system had in previous times been based on an assumption that it is possible for *all* souls to attain eternal bliss sooner or later, when the debtor-side of each soul's account should show zero. Madhwa now completed the symmetry of it by another equally rational and possible, though cruel and inhuman, assumption that the creditor-side might also show zero—the more easily because there were candidates enough for eternal hell at that time in the persecutors of the new faith. This position has recently been sought to be defended on the ground of some inexorable 'law of Nature,' which takes no account of men's nerves. But it comes with the worst grace from those who extol the *Bhakti Marga* so much.

One more doctrinal point deserves to be noticed because, so far as the writer is aware, no other Indian faith shows its like, at all events in the

form in which it is presented, that, namely, which declares that there is no salvation possible for man except through *Vayu, the son of Vishnu*. The genesis of this doctrine is hard to come at. From the earliest known times the Guru or the spiritual guide has always claimed and been allowed exceptional sanctity, because the idea of each one guiding his own spiritual progress, without any help from a learned preceptor, was never started here, and the assertion of Milton that every man has an equal right to interpret the Revealed Book according to the light that is in him, was never once so much as dreamt of in Indie. Guru Nanak, Founder of the Sikh faith, seems to have been the chief of the latter day Reformers, who laid much greater stress than had been done of old on the sanctity and necessity of the spiritual guide. But no one except Madhwa seems to have given it this remarkable shape or presented it in this highly suggestive form. What its genesis might be due to we cannot undertake to say at present. We might, therefore, just note it and pass on.

In the rules of individual and social life, so far as religion influences them, the sect, like many another of those or succeeding times, has, consciously or otherwise, drifted towards the Puranas,

though, sure enough, professing the highest regard for the *Srutis* and *Smritis*. "The fact is that, during the long course of our mediæval history, we neglected the higher and eternal teachings of the *Sruti* and swore foolishly by the lower and temporary ritualistic and caste ideals of the *Smritis and Puranas*," "and this fully accounts for our downfall." If this is a fact, then Madhwism shares it as fully as any other sect. The Guru himself in the *Thathparya Nirnaya* says that he is in an especial manner following the path indicated by the Mahabharata विशेषतो भारतवर्तमचारी in all his injunctions.

The uncompromising hatred discovered by Sri Vaishnavas in regard to the God Siva, whom many among them would not so much as hear named, was happily avoided by Madhwa, though by proclaiming the supreme Deity of Vishnu, he was forced to assign an inferior place to this God in his system.

3. ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE SANKARITE SYSTEM.

We have already had to notice the attitude of Madhwa and his followers towards the system of Sankara—an attitude which, intensified by the persecution they had suffered, drove the oppressed

to doom the heresiarch and his followers to eternal hell. How he would have behaved if he had had royal patrons to help him, or how his successors would have behaved if the persecution had begun after his departure, we cannot tell. But, coming as it did in his own time, and before the faith had definitely shaped itself and received its finishing touches, we have strong reasons to believe it contributed in no small measure to the inclusion of the *Maniman* doctrine. And though we shall in many cases do well to remember that 'the sources of religion lie hid from us', we are not perhaps far wrong, in this instance, if we suppose the singular hatred discovered by the sect to the departed guru of Adwaitism and to his doctrines, far more than to the living followers of the faith, is due to this unfortunate occurrence. It would doubtless have been exceedingly magnanimous of Madhwa to have spared the personality of the Founder of Adwaitism, who had had no hand whatever in the persecution. But he did not, and the hints thrown out in the *Thaiparya Nirnaya* were taken up by his more zealous followers like Pundit Narayana, and have been worked up into a most disgraceful libel ever written of the dead, which, mellowed by time, has

become sacred and is regarded as the first step to every student of Madhwa Theology. This libel is the companion volume to *Madhwa Vijaya* and is known as *Manimanjari*. Such are the bitter fruits of religious intolerance and persecution and, as the persecutors could not be dealt with on the principle of like for like, the weaker party necessarily had to resort to abuse.

It need hardly be said that in this, as in so many other instances, practice has shown but little correspondence to the troublesome theory of Dytias, for as a matter of fact, a few miserable fanatics apart, who might be ignored, the bulk of the sect have always moved on excellent terms with their Smartha brethren, and among the Marathi followers of the Guru, matrimonial alliances between members of the different sects have been by no means uncommon. Even the most orthodox of the sect have no objection to dine in company with Smarthas, herein happily avoiding the absurd extremes to which Sri Vaishnavas have carried matters, and now find it so hard to retrace these wrong steps. And, if people believe in what they are talking about, and if intermarriages between the different sects of Brahmins is a right step in Social Reform, then it is certainly much

easier to bring about union between the Madhwas and Smartha, than between Sri Vaishnavas and any other sect. It is to be hoped that the leaven of the West will serve as it has done in so many other ways, to smoothen the already smooth relations of the sects, and doctrinal differences will be made to occupy their proper place without disturbing social relations.

4. POPULAR FEATURES OF MADHWAISM.

Madhwaism is an excellent exposition of Neo-Hinduism in that it can be grasped by the meanest believer, there being but little of Occultism or Esotericism about it: Vishnu, whom the worshipper is asked to regard as supreme, is the *Puranic* Vishnu, and is familiar to the common reader in those bright manifestations of His, like Rama, Krishna and the rest. The writer of the sketch has been severely handled by the orthodox among the Madhwas for daring to make this statement, but he has already answered objections of this kind by his determination to write on *historical* lines. The worship of Vishnu consists in (1) *Ankana*, marking the body with His symbols, the five arms; (2) *Namakarana*, giving His names to children or other objects of love; and (3) *Bhajana*, singing his glories. The special

- stress laid by some of the disciples on the last item has given rise to two divisions among them, called respectively *Dasakutas* and *Vyasakutas*, but this is for all practical purposes a division without distinction.

The system therefore is, on the dogmatic as well as practical side, *positive*, terribly positive ; in this respect also it is diametrically opposed to Sankara's, where, (according to Pundit Narayana), absolute Nothingness is made, on the side of dogma, to go by the name of *Brahman*, and where also the Adwaitee has but too often discovered a tendency to make religion an affair of the head, of knowledge more than one of the heart and righteous character, the latter of which religion ought always to strive to be.* The Madhwa's idea of God is, in theory as well as practice, anthropomorphic even in the last resort. But if we believe with Goethe that 'man really never knows how anthropomorphic he is', and that 'in every country the masses of the people are fetish-worshippers,' we shall be

* Religion is *being* and *becoming*, not *talking*. Swami Vivekananda. Sankara has of course nothing to do with this evil feature. For at the very outset, in his शारीरक भाष्य : he has said in inimitable language—*अवगतिपर्यन्तम् ज्ञानम् । वद्यावगतिर्हि पुरुषार्थं* and the like.

-tempted to say perhaps that the faith of Madhwa is strong just where the other is weak.

We have already touched on the reform in connection with sacrifices. Sacrifice of animals in expectation of rewards in this world as well as in the other, is an old and world-wide institution, and no wonder that in India, singularly remarkable for its conservatism, it has lived on to our own day, though showing but few signs of vigorous life now. The monstrous hopes that had once been held out to the masters of sacrifices, in case they were properly gone through, according to the strict letter of the law, were bound to defeat themselves. The story of King Nahusha, his aspiration for the office of Indra and his fall on account of his incivility to the sage Agastya—all seem to wear on their face proof of the desperate straits to which those who had held out impossible promises, were driven to reduce themselves. Accordingly reaction against the sacrifice of animals set in even as early as the times of the Upanishads. The last passage of the Narayana Upanishad which goes by the name of आत्मयज्ञ (Sacrifice of Self) might have been the composition of the great Buddha himself. Heralded by such early protests came the mighty-mouthed Buddha

and the spread of his faith meant the practical abolition of sacrifices.

With the renewed activity of Neo-Hinduism, sacrifices seem to have somewhat revived, though their day was assuredly gone. And the last vestiges of bloodshed connected therewith for ever were practically done away with by Vaishnavite reformers everywhere—who with one accord have all laid the most absolute emphasis on the sufficiency of the *Bhakti marga*—by Ramanuja before the time of Madhwa, by Madhwa himself and by Chaitanya, Vallabha and others in later times. The thanks of the truly righteous are due to all of them on this account. Various were the reasons assigned or the devices adopted in the place of bloody sacrifices, and Madhwa enjoined, not indeed their complete abolition, which is impossible for any one who bases his teachings on the authority of the *Srutis*, but the substitution of a lamb made of rice-meal instead of the lamb of flesh and blood. Those who have any knowledge of the work of the शमयित in a Yagna, that is, of how the lamb is ‘done to death’ on occasions of sacrifices, still occasionally seen performed by Smarthaś, chiefly in some of the coast districts of the Madras

Presidency—where the poor animal is 'gagged and despatched 'without the shedding of blood,' in a manner too horrid for plain description—have really very good reason to feel thankful to Madhwa for having stopped it, so far at least as his own followers are concerned. We might also notice with pleasure that the chief temples and shrines managed in Madhwa interests are, as a rule, free from the objectionable services of *Dera-Dasis* (prostitutes) and the pujaris or priests are in many instances of much better social standing than the kurukkals or other tribes akin to them.

The Puranic leanings of the faith have naturally enlarged the sphere of the professional *Pauranica* or the Rhetor. And as saints multiplied in course of time, red-letter days also increased in number, which, together with the memorable days common to all sects, have made the Madhwa year one round of festivals and saints' days. Puranas in praise of Gods and of Saints, have also naturally multiplied in fearful numbers, some passable, many puerile, if not positively harmful, by reason of the low taste and lower accomplishments prevailing among the latter day Pundits who composed them. The Madhwa men and women have acquired the habit of attending

Puranic recitals in large numbers, and if the right kind *Pauranicas* could be found or made to carry on this work, the institution may be made to serve excellent educational purposes. Such as it is, it has resulted in a better organisation among them than among other sects, and the average Madhwa knows more about his *Guru* and his faith than the average Smartha, to whom Sankaracharya often means no more than the ruling Priest at Sringeri or elsewhere.

5. GENESIS OF THE CARDINAL DOCTRINES OF THE FAITH.

If it is once admitted that Religion has had a history like everything else, and that each Reformer merely 'set to music the tunes haunting a large number of ears,' it becomes easy for us to understand that Madhwism has assimilated many things from preceding faiths and rejected others. We saw something of what it rejected in the Sankarite system and what it took in from Ramanuja's. There were several other faiths flourishing in this part of India, at the time of Madhwa's advent, and in particular Jainism, whose stronghold the Canaras had become, after its downfall in the Chola and Pandya Kingdoms. It would be a marvel if Madhwa's inquiring

mind had not been influenced at all by these faiths and their practices. It is, of course, impossible to anatomise Madhwa doctrines and practices and group them and assign this to Jainism, that to Saivism, that to another and so on and so forth. But some of them bear clear impress of their origin and it is the legitimate duty of history to take note of them. It may well be that the Founder of a sect might not himself have been able to trace the steps through which his mind had passed before he was able to give a definite shape to a doctrine. But though he could not discover it himself, men who do not live in the midst of the bustle connected with a reform movement or live long after it, and have no vested interests to guard, can compare things in 'the cool shade of retirement,' and make inferences, provided always that they hold themselves ready to change every one of them when solid reasons are given therefor.

There is, moreover, ample direct evidence in this case to prove that Madhwa had learned the systems of the twenty-one rival faiths, if only to refute their arguments, which he has done in his commentaries on the Vedanta Sutras. That he had had no scruple to learn

even the *Mlechcha* language is proved by the statement in Madhwa Vijaya that he had picked up Persian enough to parley with hostile Mahomedans in North India. Under such circumstances, it would have been exceedingly strange if he had not acquainted himself with the faith of the Jains by whom he was surrounded or even that of the Christians having a settlement at Kalyan or thereabout, very near Udipi. In judging the attitude of the Founder of a faith, we must make up our mind to exclude the attitude of the modern heads of *matts* in regard to these matters. These latter repose on the glory of the Founder, secure from fear of violence or spoliation under the most impartial government they have ever had, and have the luck to be placed in situations where ignorance is bliss. They, therefore, very properly refuse to commit the folly of being wise, i.e., learning anything.

The greatest difficulty in connection with an investigation of this kind is the sensitiveness of the followers of the faith under examination. In all cases of living faiths, of which Madhwaism is one, the orthodox, from the way in which they are brought up, feel shocked when their cherished beliefs are touched with intent to be 'cut up,'

and professed theologians have always raised a cry of horror when religion is treated like any other institution. They are afraid that if, for instance, a particular doctrine of a *Guru* is shown to have been adapted from a previously known source, the *Guru* loses his divinity, and his system its revealed nature. They call him ungodly who rejects absurd miracles. They never bring themselves to agree that in the case of Madhwa, it is glory enough for him to have composed the works that he has left behind, and that his 'divine' nature and his greatness will not be one whit the less, for the total rejection of all the miracles associated with his name. He has been able to pour old wine into new bottle without breaking it, and that is divinity enough for any teacher. For "religions, which stake their existence on the belief of men in certain occurrence true or alleged, instead of basing themselves on truths independent of time and place, and satisfying man's spiritual needs and aspirations,—always run the risk of losing their hold on the thinking portion of the followers thereof."

Bearing in mind these difficulties as well as the fact that our examination has for its aim not certainly decrying the merits of any person,

but search after historic truth, we might now look at two or three features of Madhwaism, whose genesis seems plain and easily traceable. To begin with, there is the doctrine of the Divine Person with *attributes*, repeated and upheld ever so oft, and the substitution of 'mealy' lamb for the lamb of flesh. The doctrine and this healthy reform appear due to the strong Jain influence found in Canara at that time. The curious may compare the invocation of the *guru* before commencing the *Sutra Bhashya*, with the invocation of *Amarasimha*. The Jain tenderness for animal life has had a long, noble, and even ludicrous history, but the *guru*, as one might expect, based his reform on an episode in the *Mahabharata*.

Again, we have seen that the doctrine of salvation solely through *Vayu*, son of *Vishnu*, is to be found in this form in Madhwaism alone of all the faiths of India. It is tempting, though it is undesirable, to connect this at once with the doctrine of the only other great faith which proclaims it—Christianity. But unless we are sure of the steps through which the one was metamorphosed into the other, asserting the Christian origin of this doctrine serves only to

wound the feelings of the orthodox. At this stage, therefore, we have merely to rest content with noting its singularity, as well as the singular nature of another doctrine—that concerning eternal Hell—though in this latter case its origin can well be connected with the troubles under which the faith happened to spread.

Add, to points of doctrine, certain remarkable incidents and even expressions used by the Pundit in his life of the Guru, for instance, the flight to the temple of Udupi in the boyhood of the teacher, the fasting and prayer before the proclamation of the faith, multiplying ‘loaves’ and even such phrases as *giving out the good news* and *fishing for men*. These are too numerous to be put down as the results of mere coincidence, though not of that kind which can force conviction on neutral minds. It is difficult to measure the work of forces which act through unconscious cerebration which is the only way of accounting for their presence in Madhwa Vijaya, in the absence of more solid evidence.

6. SOCIAL ASPECT OF THE FAITH.

It has often been given out by more than one writer that the mission of Ramanuja was one of Social Reform under a religious guise. The fact

is pointed out in proof that Tamil has been placed by Vaishnavite saints on a footing of equality with Sanskrit, which always was, as it is now, a sealed book to the multitude. If it ever was intended by Ramanuja or his successors as a Social Reform movement, it has had a singular result at the present day, for having asked for bread, his disciples seem to have been verily favoured with stone! No such claim can possibly be advanced in regard to Madhwā. His teachings were mainly addressed to Brahmins. So that, except the Malavas of South Canara, who own special allegiance to the Shivalli Brahmins there, and a few hundreds of the gold-smith caste in Coimbatore (who streak their foreheads after the manner of Madhwās, though it is difficult to say that they do anything more), there are no other non-Brahmin adherents of the faith to be met with—at least so far as the writer is aware.

The Guru, it is to be feared, has enjoined on his followers a system of fasting too rigorous to have healthy influence. Herein likewise one is tempted to see Jain influences, whose overdoing of fasts has long passed the bounds of reason and common sense. The orthodox have to fast from year's end to year's end, on one account and an-

other. It is not that kind of fasting which is content with the mid-day meal, but absolute abstention from eating and drinking. The average Madhwa physique has, therefore, had good reason to suffer, in so far as any one has chosen to be really orthodox. Let it be understood that it is not fasting but the *overdoing* of it that is here had in view. The writer has reason to believe it is being overdone, though under the high pressure of modern life, the rigour of it is necessarily giving way. On widows' heads, the rigour falls with all its violence, though this cannot move the sympathy of a people, among whom widows are praised in proportion to their efforts to hasten their end.

It would be a marvel if, after the experience of Europe and India in previous times, Madhwa Theology had exercised any useful or healthy influence on culture. Examples of beautiful originals ruthlessly tampered with, because of their connection with heathen, pagan, or heretic authors, will readily occur to the reader of Papal history and Madhwaism has, sure enough, had its own share in that kind of work, though on a very small scale. In the Bhagavata, for instance, an entire chapter, confessedly no interpolation, is

omitted in Madhwa recitals, because it attributes ignorance to the Creator. And it has placed on a footing of equality masterpieces of art like the Ramayana of Valmiki or the Mahabharata of Vyasa, with the Yamaka Bbarata of Madhwa, with an evident partiality for this ecclesiastical common-place of a pedantic age. Theology and sweet reasonableness seem always to have been constitutionaly opposed to, and been poles apart, from each other.*

But when all is said, the fact remains that Madhwaism is one of the most living of Indian faiths, and is happily free from any of those abominations connected with the North Indian Vaishnavism of Chaitanya, Vallabha or others. A well-meaning, though harsh, countryman of ours has said in regard to these sects of Hindustan that "the beastly Aghori, the Bacchanalian Tantric and the dissolute Vaishnava are a disgrace to the Hindu name and religion." None of the chief sects of South India can be charged with sins which can justify in any degree such severe judgment.

* Mr. Achar's appreciation of the literary merits of *Madhwa Vijia* and *Manimanjari* is the latest illustration hereof.

7. THE SABHA AT TIRUPATI.

Among other proofs of its vigorous life is the annual gathering of Madhwas, at Tirupati under the name of *Sriman Madhwa Siddhanthonnahini*. It has been in existence for over twenty years and has now had a secure financial basis given to it. We shall, therefore, conclude with a glance at its aims, objects and prospects.

In the first place the Sabha aims at 'manufacturing' good family priests and holds examinations annually, offering prizes to successful students of Madhwa Theology. In itself it is not bad, but what the future is that is reserved for people who are taught to believe every syllable of Manimajari and Madhwa Vijaya to be gospel truths and who have to act as spiritual guides to enlightened Madhwa laymen, we cannot tell. The latter may good-naturedly let them alone, pay them for their services and send them home satisfied—but whether this kind of priesthood is the best possible or desirable, no one can venture to tell. The evil, however, is not one confined to any one sect—its roots are spread deep and wide and it calls more loudly with each day for some effective remedies.

Secondly, the Sabha answers questions puzzling

the orthodox on doctrinal or practical points. But this part of the work is necessarily of interest only to the followers of the faith, and the subjects range from the determination of the language of birds in heaven to observance of the *Ekadasi* fast on different days.

Thirdly, the Sabha tries to attract laymen and induce them to read Theology. This is certainly a promising step forward, for laymen are not so fanatical as the Vydeeks or priestly class, and they can exercise greater influence for good over the society, and if they do, one huge block in the way of reforms will disappear. In the hands of enlightened laymen qualified to speak on Theology and Shastras, the Sabha is bound to become stronger and more useful. It will be able to solve the question of the priest, not as it is done now, but in a really hopeful way. It will exercise a healthy control over mutts and their heads and the right use of charitable endowments. It will read the signs of the times aright and in its endeavours to further the interests of the faith, will not be blind to changed and changing circumstances. It will quietly starve out the Dytia theory and its illustrious progeny, since strangling them is manifestly impossible. It will take care not to

let ignorant or fanatic priests indulge in irresponsible talk concerning institutions of whose aims they can learn absolutely nothing. And it will not convert itself into an engine of social oppression and tyranny in the hands of self-seeking individuals.

The Sabha, therefore, so long as it is guided wisely and restricts itself to its legitimate work, may become an excellent denominational concern, promoting the interests of the faith without yielding an inch in point of dogma or innocent practices. But in order that it might do it, it must take for its motto the precept of Him, who at one time, was regarded as the arch-enemy of Hinduism, and later on strangely enough, as one of the avatars of Vishnu, the precept, that is, of Gautama the Buddha. It runs :—" *Hatred is not quenched by hatred at any time. Hatred is quenched by love. This is its nature.*"

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MADHWACHARYA.

BY

MR. S. SUBBA RAU, M. A.

INTRODUCTORY.



ABOUT the middle of the twelfth century, India south of the Vindhya range was being governed by native potentates. The Aryan community was habitually giving serious and due attention to its religious, philosophical, and literary pursuits, though there might have been considerable disturbance by war or political changes. It was already some centuries since the Buddhistic influence had been completely subverted, or had declined for want of political support. By this time, the Vedanta system had come to be studied as expounded by Sri Sankaracharya while the older orthodox expositions were consigned to oblivion. It should not be forgotten that, besides the Vedas, Vedangas, Puranas, Itihasas, etc., there was an earlier literature in every other branch of knowledge. Generally, people had still intense faith in that the Vedas etc. are the repositories of truth and wisdom, though the common reader or thinker did not hope to derive therefrom a

systematic idea of their contents. The philosophy of Maya was a most fascinating study, and its influence was widespread. But thoughts of opposite schools could not be blotted out of existence ; they were only smouldering till they should be blown into a flame by a strong breath, as of Sri Ramanuja, or of Sri Madhwa. The former bases his exposition on an earlier treatise called Bodhayana Vritti; and the latter institutes a comparative study of the common and oldest authorities, and interprets them in the light of sound logic, giving full value to the internal evidence before he arrives at his conclusions. This feature gives the study of Sri Madhwa's works a historical importance as throwing light either on a very early stage, or on different stages, of philosophical thinking.

THE INFLUENCES IN THE COUNTRY.

Sri Madhwacharya is generally known over South India as a great religious reformer, and an orthodox commentator on the Brahma Sutras, and the famous ten Upanishads. He was born of a Tulu Brahmin, in a village near the small town of Udupi in the District of South Canara. Of late, there has been a slight question about the date of his birth, some holding it to be about 1118 A.D., others about 1199 A.D. At this time,

the narrow strip on the Western Coast beyond the Ghats was comparatively secure from molestation. It had long ago become the asylum of many Brahmin families as well as of Brahminical learning. Here, the native princes extended to them their liberal patronage, while the people cherished a veneration for them. The archives of the old literature which the immigrants had brought with them were not exposed to the destructive influence of foreign invasions. Here, too, the traces of some ancient cults and several aspects of the Aryan religious life may, to this day, point to an interesting phase of the past history. The worship of Vishnu, especially in the form of Sri Krishna, so general on that Coast, is a sure indication that the influence of the *Bhagavatas* was great there, if not all-sweeping. Even when the country was convulsed with the study of the Advaitic Philosophy there did not cease to be staunch adherents of older systems. The prevailing study, however, had not much interfered with the crystallised religious beliefs and practices. The religious and philosophical literature largely consisted of dialectics and polemics, full of sophistry, mostly written in the old style.* Great erudition was often displayed

* Many of them are now lost.

to confound the ordinary thinker, which filled the masses with wonder and blind admiration. Such was the character of the learning that commanded approbation generally of scholars, too. Hence, great was the difficulty in the way of one holding opposite views. The only hopeful course was to ransack the authoritative literature, Vedic and later, and to replace sophistry by sound reasoning that may not prove self-destructive. In these circumstances was Sri Madhwa placed when he came forward as a teacher. As himself a pupil, he had begun by respectfully pointing out the faults and fallacies in the works taught to him. When he was himself challenged to expound the established system, he won admiration by means of his perfect familiarity with the traditional interpretation and exposition. After giving proofs of the intuitive yet masterly insight into the philosophical lore, he discovered to the view of the unbiassed, of course, very emphatically, how the established system was not satisfactory either in the light of sacred authorities or in respect of accurate reasoning. Naturally, he was next challenged to expound the true Vedic Philosophy, and he chose to present his views by means of quotations from works which were, at the time, admitted to be great authorities,

and by means of the Logic recognised by those authorities, *viz.*, the Vedas, Pancharatra, Itihasa, and Brahmatarka, to which last constant reference is given in his works.

THE SCOPE OF THE PAPER.

Thus, we see that he does not claim any originality on his part for the system. He comes forward only as an orthodox interpreter of the system which the Brhma Sutras are intended to teach. A foreign critic justly observes that the system of Philosophy taught by Sri Madhwacharya does not seem to command itself to many, simply because they are prejudiced by the name 'Dualistic Philosophy', which, he thinks, is a misnomer; and that, if properly presented, it will find more readers in the world than any other. Accordingly, it is purposed to sketch here, a general view of the cardinal principles and of the general course of reasoning employed to maintain them. Indeed, the task is beset with peculiar difficulties; for the positions and aspects of the system cannot be effectively described and presented unless a searching contrast is instituted between this and all the other Schools of Thought both ancient and modern; and to make its distinctive character sufficiently clear, a huge volume may have to be written. But

the task here undertaken is a very humble one. This is intended only as a preparation of the mind for more elaborate study and research into this philosophical literature.

PHILOSOPHY DEFINED.

At the present day, the term 'Philosophy' is used in connection with many branches of study and the reader would be glad to be told what notion he should form here by the word. Etymologically, it means 'Love of wisdom', and this sense may not seem to suit its present function to convey the most generalised course of thought. An enquiry, however, intended to arrive at the most generalised knowledge of things and the spirit in which that knowledge is to be sought may be taken to be the full meaning of the word. For the 'Love of wisdom' is and must be the motive power to speed the journey on that long and tedious road of enquiry. Now, wisdom cannot be what it is if it did not imply invariable reference to '*TRUTH*', or reality or facts, that is, to things as such and as they are in the given place and time. For the purposes of the present paper, philosophy may be taken to mean : (I) A system of knowledge always having reference to *Truth*, that is, things as they are both in their

gross forms and in their subtle and ultimate state; and (II) A system of teaching or writing which is devoted to investigation into the nature of things as a means of attaining to such a knowledge of *Truth*.

TRUTH.

"Truth"—It is a most charming word. Under this name, anything might acquire an importance and attractiveness which need not be real. To many, 'Truth' seems to stand apart from things that are true. For they are prone to think that 'Truth' as forming part and parcel of things has nothing of that grandeur which they would or could see in the abstract 'Truth.' Therefore, the Acharya first interrupts this pleasant notion and tells them that 'Truth' is inseparable from the things that are true. Accordingly, his system deals with the ultimate and most general question, what things are fundamentally true, why they should be accepted as such, what relations do subsist and can be logically conceived to subsist or maintained, on authority, between the fundamentals, or between them and their products, or between the several products.

MADHVA A PHILOSOPHER.

Since very few of the modern scholars know him to be a philosopher in the highest sense of

the word, an examination of the ground work of Philosophy is worth making at the outset. A reasoned and general system of religion of any stability must stand on a worthy philosophical view of all the related things in the range of knowledge. His works clearly show that he worked at his system with such a persuasion and he has written more on points of philosophy than on those of religion. Accordingly, he has written a set of works called Prakaranas, that is, small accessory treatises dealing severally with points connected with the main system. These inculcate those principles of logic which should safely guide the thinker through the intricate maze of enquiry. It is therefore, of great advantage at the very threshold to give or receive the warning that, at every step, we should be careful not to jump out of the only ground on which we can possibly stand.

KNOWLEDGE: ITS RELATIVITY.

Now then, the enquiry starts naturally with a survey of that fundamental ground, namely Thought or Knowledge. The nature of that ground must be certainly examined, for, only on this available ground, Sri Madhwa rests his philosophy as well as his religion. Thought or

Knowledge, whether it is the experience of common parlance or some essential property of some substratum, or that substance itself, it cannot be what it is or must be, when the Knower and the Known correlated to Thought are denied, or are not admitted; for such denial cannot cease to be self-destructive. Thus, in the Acharya's system, consistency rules and exercises a sovereign power over all Thought and its correlatives, and must therefore commend itself to all those that respect the Laws of Thinking. In his view, nothing may deserve to be called philosophy which does not stand the test of this sovereign rule, for this alone can warrant the fundamentals that may be arrived at. In his view, all the theories that have been, or will ever be propounded do belong to all times, and they are only subject to the force of a current that may at a time, submerge some and allow some others to float and prevail on the surface. Hence the position he takes up as the mere expounder of Sri Badarayana's system is neither inconsistent nor without proof.

THE VEDAS AND LOGIC.

In his view, too, the Vedas are the representatives (in sound) of the ideas of all times, and he

can recognise the authoritativeness of the Vedas in a sense or in a degree in which even other teachers of Orthodoxy have not done or cannot do; for to these, they are no better than phenomenal things of the limited world. Whereas, Sri Madhwa considers the Vedas as both Truth and means of knowing the Truth, permanent and absolute. This position *might seem* inconsistent with the logical character specially claimed for the system. It is, however, a mistake due to misconception of the function or province of Logic, which, by itself, cannot become an independant means of knowledge i.e., of knowing the Truth. (*Vide pp. 18 to 24*)

THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC.

The familiar 'I' or the individual self is evidently the primary factor or basis involved or implied in knowledge either as a means, or as the resultant, or as something without which no knowledge could be. The nature of its working exhibits a purpose to which means is adapted, and generally implies means and causes beyond itself. Now, the means of knowledge has been generally recognised as threefold ; viz., the Sense-Perception, the Word, and Reasoning or Logic. The sphere of the senses is, after all, admitted as very limited; and logic or

reasoning does not *independantly* furnish facts. On the other hand, it has only to examine the facts furnished by any independant means of knowledge, Perception or the Word, as the case may be. Though the modern thinker may find it difficult to understand how the Word may be such a means, the subject has been sifted by Aryan scholars with a marvellous power of intuition and consistent Logic. And so he would do well to consider the subject with due deference. The Aryan thinker concedes that the sphere of the Word is far wider than that of the senses; first, this is true even in the case of human testimony. Admitting for the present that the Word can furnish facts which are beyond the range of the senses, we may see that all reasoning must proceed on the facts furnished by Sense Perception or Testimony. In the process of reasoning we deduce new facts; but all the same, the reasoning is by nature so dependent upon the facts furnished by other means, that it can never rise to the rank of an independent means of knowledge. Logic is in the first place useful for testing the consistency of successive observations and notions and correcting the errors that may creep into the various sources of know-

ledge, and secondly, by virtue of consistency in the course of nature, for assuming certain other facts or relations not directly known by Pratyaksha or Word. Thus, the real function or scope of Logic is that it must subserve the authority of the sense-perception or of the Word ; and that Logic and Testimony (of the Word) may both unitedly elucidate certain truths without any shadow of inconsistency about them. . Perhaps, there is no great thinker who does not recognise this very essential and primary principle; but this recognition is after all a mere promise, and it is no assurance of its observance. No thought is worthy of any regard, no item of knowledge is of any value, unless and until it is thoroughly examined with reference to its contents and is found to be free from the self-destructive inconsistency. Accordingly, the Acharya has, in proving sure every step he takes, to pass in review the positions taken by all the other writers. Very often, statements conveying really distinct ideas are misunderstood as conveying one and the same idea, or *vice-versa*; and against such mistakes he has to warn us. Again, the first principles often happen to be so general and subtle, that they cannot be easily grasped

unless the contrary is seen side by side to be absurd.

Since thought or idea is the motive power that urges us onward in the path of enquiry, every detail of the enquiry must be cast in the mould of thought or idea, when that may be said to be within our grasp. The Acharya's system, therefore, opens with an examination of evidence.

EVIDENCE OR PRAMANA.

General.

The term Pramana or evidence is by most philosophers understood only as the means by which things are apprehended, but the Acharya goes a step further and recognises the apprehension (knowledge) to be the primary and direct evidence of the thing that is apprehended ; for when the idea is up it does not imply any medium for its relation to the thing represented ; while the means, having led to the result, namely, the apprehension, withdraws itself as it were from the field of idea, not intervening in any manner or degree between the knowledge and the known. That is to say, the organs for instance only help on the faculty of understanding, but do not form any part of the understanding when it has risen, and do not require the idea again to pass through them to the

object. Hence the Acharya lays down that apprehension or knowledge is the primary and direct evidence of what is perceived. The secondary evidence or the means of evidence is of three kinds, though some other systems recognise four or more. The three sources of knowledge recognised by the Acharya are (1) sense-perception or the senses, known as *Pratyaksha*, (2) Reasoning or Ratiocination, (3) Word or Testimony, while *Upamana*, or Analogy admitted by others, is shown to be a variety of Ratiocination or Reasoning. This classification of *Pramanas* (the means of evidence) makes it clear that according to this system, experiential *thought* or *idea* as any other fact, claims for the law of Causation a fundamental character which some thinkers may hesitate to allow. Whether *thought* or *idea* is essentially a new product at every step or only a disclosure, the antecedent circumstances, not being the material cause, cannot be said in any manner to form part and parcel of the resulting, or the disclosed, idea. For instance, light, the object, place, time and vision, all may be required and contribute to the rise of a particular idea, but do not constitute the idea. In every act of knowing, the relation of the Knower and the Known,

or rather the relation of Knowledge to the Known is direct i.e., implies no *mediacy*. How to jump out of this relation, it is not possible to understand. So long as the faculty remains what it is, this relation must be. Bereft of this relation, anything or nothing can be called knowledge. If we deny, the very denial implies an idea, or it is the expression of an idea. Therefore the means or circumstances that are invariably the antecedents of a particular idea becomes the evidence or the medium of knowledge of a thing, not directly, but through the idea or knowledge which they are instruments in producing. Hence these are called Secondary or *Mediate Evidence*, as only serving to produce that which is the immediate evidence of the known. To define it succinctly, *Evidence is either that (the idea) which by virtue of its own nature has direct reference to what is cognised, or that which is the means of or help to such cognition.* Both the immediate and the mediate must stand the tests that may be applied when necessary to prove their validity. Every idea or apprehension, as it arises, implies its own validity by virtue of its nature. It does not involve or imply, (for it cannot), a doubt of itself. On the other hand, the validity

of any idea or thought may be questioned or impeached at the instance of some other idea or thought which claims greater or absolute validity and effectually contradicts that prior notion. Now, two points are to be kept distinct in view :—
 (1) The Genesis of an idea or notion, and (2) its validity.

(1) The rising of a Notion or Thought depends upon the means, circumstances or causes which are the antecedents.

(2) As already pointed out, a notion rises implying its own validity i.e. it does not rise implicating a suspicion of its own validity ; for it often induces action in expectation of the realisation of the purpose—and in the natural course, the notion, the action and the realisation do in very many cases correspond together and the notion of its validity often stands tested. When any notion is rejected as false, the explanation of its invalidity is to be found in the means and antecedent circumstances. For, when a perception is produced by virtue of the 'the means of knowledge,' an expectation of realising the thing induces the necessary action ; but, if the action is not fruitful, the perception or notion is rejected as illusive. Here, only the means, etc., are considered to be

at fault, defective or erroneous or misleading. So it is clear that naturally and primarily, no notion or idea implies a suspicion of itself. Such a suspicion is always caused by a subsequent corrective notion or thought.

All that has been said of evidence and knowledge plainly supposes the relation of knowledge, on the one hand, to the Knower of whom it is an attribute, and, on the other, to the Known, to which it refers generally as something different and distinct from itself. The Acharya holds this as the most fundamental of all the first principles of his Philosophy—namely, *there is no perception, notion, or idea which might stand unrelated to the Knower and the Known*, for, all inquiry must start with, and all acceptable conclusions must be in terms of, such knowledge; otherwise, any system of thought reluctant to recognise this fundamental position must, he thinks, stand self-condemned. Besides the three Pramanas accepted in this system, there are several others named by other Schools of Thought, which are, however, shown to be varieties of any one of the three. Pratyaksha or sense-perception and Anumana or Reasoning are readily admitted as the two sources of knowledge derived by experience.

THE NATURE OF THE WORD AS EVIDENCE.

The authoritativeness of the Word or Testimony has a peculiar significance and requires a special effort of the modern mind to perceive the force of admitting it as such.

Sabda or Testimony may for all practical purposes be supposed a record, rather a permanent exponent, of ideas (eternal or other, as the case may be), which, not being within the range of our sense experience, are still conveyed to us by the power of the Word.

It has been questioned whether Logic is first or the authority (Testimony). A careful review of the works of Sri Madhwacharya discloses the fact that there can be no sort of inconsistency or contradiction between them. Logic or logical principles, we know, are founded upon the relation of things in actual observation. If we hold that logical principles are valid and useful in questions dealing with such matters of observation, we can with equal truth and profit admit their validity and usefulness in the province of the authority or testimony. The Acharya does not draw any great distinction of kind between the authority of the Senses and that of Testimony. If the scientist of to-day would say that he can detect things

beyond the range of the naked eye with the aid of a telescope or microscope, or with some *light* rays similar to the well-known X-rays, the Acharya tells us that even the gross physical senses when refined by the processes of Yoga or other means in the laboratory of one's own physical frame—they are capable of performing functions which we now deny of them. Now the testimony would be nothing but the record of observations by the refined senses and organs. Then the principles of Logic which we restrict to the province of the meagre sense-experience are only and naturally extended to the whole field of knowledge and means thereof. And it is hereby clear that our restriction after all evinces a sort of narrow-mindedness.

Again we should clearly bear in mind that logical principles must follow actual facts and the facts cannot primarily arise in accordance with any assumption, baseless assumption, that we may be apt to make. If the Acharya emphasises the absolute authority of Testimony and tells us that all Logic is nothing but a consistent construing of the Testimony as it is of sense-experiences, it is this truth that he has successfully brought home to the mind of thinkers. Likewise he very

often warns us against the very great and frequent danger of being led away by false generalisations and analogies, which are but attempts to connect the unconnected things by a stretch of imagination. He constantly therefore draws our attention to the individual character and nature of facts and things—a position most fundamental in the genesis as well as the history of knowledge. The difference between the individual things is as essential a part of each as agreement or similarity. So we are told and we also observe the points of community are not identical but are only similar standing forth or running side by side like parallel lines.

To start with, another important and common mistake has to be warned against. The logical principles are not the means of knowledge, but they are only certain laws that obtain between the ideas in so far as these are tested to be true with reference to the things implied by them. So when we say that these principles follow actual facts, it should always be kept vivid in the mind that the facts are *proved* ideas but not fancies.

The above explanation of the Authority of Testimony (Word) might appear to conflict with our favourite view that the Vedas are eternal like

God. They are not even admitted as the composition of the Deity, through whose grace they become revealed to holy men. A little consideration will show that the seeming conflict is of no real consequence, while the theory itself turns our attention to two important conceptions. Are we to suppose that we live in a world which is by time and space unconnected with all the past and all the future? Or are we to suppose that we live in it connected with the whole stream of time and space? Granting that our present world is a creation of some thousand years, could we deny the existence of similar worlds both in the past and in the future? If we deny it, the inductive hazard should become altogether unreliable. If we grant it in the past, of what benefit should it be to us except by way of making us wiser with a record of the past history? Through the eternity of time, how many should be admitted in the past? We cannot possibly stop without alighting upon an infinite series of things, facts and ideas, worlds and records representing them. The recognition of an infinite series is a clear explanation of the term eternity. So, in the first place, every great thinker, perceives that the Testimony of words must essentially embody such eternal ideas. Next, when the

distinction is drawn between the eternal and the human' (the natural and artificial, so to say,) Testimony, there is a compulsion to see the difference between their import. The *modern* scholar might, however, hope to easily dispose of the question on the ground of ignorance as to authorship. But this cannot be a satisfactory solution to one who perceives and distinguishes the character of the various ideas and their basis. Whatever the solution of the question may ultimately be, no difficulty can however be conceived in the way of admitting the authoritativeness of *true ideas*. Hence, the Acharya divides the authoritative Testimony into Apaurusheya (that which is not the composition of any person), and Paurusheya (composition of some person). This distinction implies the assumption that the former wholly consists of true ideas, which become the standard for others, but do not require to be proved by some other standard; whereas the latter Testimony admits of test or demonstration as against the ideas of the former and of sense-experience. We know that the ultimates should only be self-evident truths, and even those are to be perceived as such by every individual who has to acquire knowledge. Then we cannot say

that the process of cognition or perception, can make the eternal things, and ideas non-eternal or changeable. If the eternal Testimony should have been seen from time to time to represent such ideas, etc, its authoritativeness arises from itself. The general principle in determining whence arises the validity of a perception is that the means of knowledge, not being defective or interfered with, leads to a correct apprehension by its own virtue.

Further, it may be sufficient that the simplest elements of Language are eternal to be only discovered and used by us at different stages of advancement, for which we are endowed with faculties. Hence the fifty-elements alone of Speech might be, the Acharya would allow, sufficient to be admitted as Eternal. They are said to be all-pervading, i.e. they must be admitted to be everywhere. All occurring every where, a particular combination, when revealed to a particular Saint and recognised by his superior vision to be the Eternal Record or Representative of certain idens, the Combination is a piece of the Vedas. A fuller discussion of this point must form the subject of a separate work.

If a certain item of sense-perception is indisputably correct and valid, it would then be impossible to accept as valid a statement contradic-

ting that. Moreover, our understanding of the language is generally based on our sense experience and only through this, language can help us to conceive things and facts, when these are beyond the range of direct observation or of Inference. Thus the Acharya recognises the importance of the Sense-Perception as the first opening of the gates of Knowledge to be acquired through other means than self-intuition. In human nature, intuition, though the very basis, is yet limited in many aspects in the case of the souls.

The next point to be constantly borne in mind is that, if sense-perception furnishes facts on which the process of reasoning primarily depends, the Word does it on a larger scale in relation to what may lie beyond the range of our senses. Neither *Pratyaksha* nor *Sabda* (Word) can be treated as a variety of *Inference*, since the processes involved in this are not required in the other two.

OBJECTIVE REALITY.

From what has been said it is clear that the theory of knowledge as maintained here implies objective existence and reality of things, facts, or aspects in relation to the Self as the knower. Then the reality of such objective existence or aspect is the first of the philosophical points to be

considered. From the logical conception of a fact or Reality, there is no necessity for supposing that whatever is not eternal or unchanging cannot be Truth or reality or fact. Even a phenomenon that may last for a single moment is a fact, and the perception thereof as a phenomenon is a true and correct perception. In the first place, knowledge generally implies an object as existing out of itself. With reference to such an object the primary notion takes the form "it is a thing," more correctly, "it is" (the positive). The notion "it is not" (the negative), surely depends upon the primary positive notion 'it is'; for without this reference, the second notion does not arise. Hence we have a practical definition:—That with reference to which the notion 'it is not' cannot primarily arise at all times or at all places, constitutes the existence (*being*) of a thing. When a perception arises of the knowing Self or of anything else, its existence is implied in the very first apprehension, as also the reality or validity of the apprehension. If in certain cases, the perception happens to be at variance with the facts implied in it, and it is to be given up as false, some other perception, at least, that which proves the preceding to be a

mistake, must certainly claim this reality and validity ; otherwise, every notion would have to be given up as a mistake without proof—a position that cannot save one from self-contradiction. In fact, no proof or argument has yet been advanced free from this serious objection, to prove the unreality of the objective world, or even of the different aspects of the very knowing Self. Numerous are the attempts made to show that knowledge cannot comprehend anything except itself ; that is to say, ideas themselves stand as the knower and the known and such relation must be false—this view is agreeable to some thinkers ; for, these philosophers think that since nothing can be proved or stated except in terms of ideas, the objective relation implied by them is all due to some unaccountable nature ever tending to mistake—perhaps this opinion alone excepted. Against all such positions, the Acarya proves how they are untenable and shows that they invariably fling themselves into self-contradiction and ignore the operation of the Law of Causation ; for the unreal cannot have an appearance even, cannot become the object of misapprehension, and cannot therefore be causally connected, with *any* effect.

As already pointed out, it is not possible to

declare *all* ideas to be altogether illusions; otherwise, even in the sphere of common experience, the distinction of true and false ideas should cease to be of any value or meaning. Supposing that *all* ideas are illusions, we should analyse the mental phenomenon of illusion or mis-apprehension so as to find an explanation. The analysis shows that there is an object positively presented, and it does not essentially vanish, but that aspect alone vanishes which is superimposed or super-added by the mind which is misled by its similarity etc. to think of other things, when the thing presented is perceived through defective senses or faulty means. Thus the analysis forces the acceptance of two *real things* (*viz.*, the thing presented and that another which is suggested by the point of similarity) without which no misapprehension can ever arise. The *being* of what is presented, but not perceived as it is, becomes predicated of what is suggested by force of association. Then, if the notion which might imply the unreality of the world of difference, be a notion having reference to some aspect or attribute of something else, this at least must be admitted to be true or real. If, on the other hand, the subsequent notion, too, should arise without

-any reference at all, it cannot correct any preceding notion.

BHEDA OR DIFFERENCE.

Further, the ideas of distinction cannot be accounted for, so long as no intrinsic essential peculiarities are admitted in the things themselves which are connected as causes with the several notions. Therefore, the Acharya holds that in the *proper exercise* of the senses and faculties all the apprehensions or notions are representatives of Truth. Hence, the un-impeached notions implying relations prove difference to be a truth whether it is in *things* or aspects. This is the next most fundamental principle.

DIFFERENCE—WHETHER CONVENTIONAL.

Could we not dispose of the notion of difference as conventional? We cannot; for if a certain distinction be called conventional, it does not mean it is false. We have the ordinary distinction as positive and negative. In the ordinary acceptation, it cannot be proved absolutely unreal. It does not cease to be, even if we use the terms in a different order. Wherein has convention its own origin? It is not possible to conceive that mere convention could make the distinction which is not. On the other hand, when distinction already exists, convention

steps in in the use of the term or of any such mark to denote the distinctness and thereby to help memory and further thought, and facilitate communication. So the term is conventional and it may not matter whether this term or that is appropriated to denote this or that aspect or thing of those under consideration. Such terms either need not be unreal. Nothing could be found to prove that things causing the notion of difference come into existence or vanish merely by virtue of convention. It cannot be supposed that the notion is baseless *i. e.*, arises without sufficient cause. When we are thus compelled to find the cause of it in the very nature of things by what virtue could convention make the objective difference an unreality? We may perhaps, by an effort of will, differently use the terms positive and negative, and palpably there might be no inconvenience in a few cases; when, however, the genesis of the terms positive and negative as embodying the antecedent thoughts is investigated into, it is not possible to hold that they have to represent something arbitrary or unconnected with all true ideas. A simple yet apt illustration we find in the commonest terms *up* and *down*. Might we not freely change

the denotation of these two words and say 'We are going up hill' when we descend, and 'We go down hill' when we ascend? We might; but the distinction between ascent and descent was not produced, and could not be annihilated, by the use of the terms.

Many other explanations are sought to deny the validity of the notion of difference as well as the objective difference involved in the notion. Some of them may be examined before Sri Madhwa's conclusion is stated. The notion of *duality* is supposed to be induced and regulated by time and space, evidently on the assumption that they are unreal in themselves. It may be just asked whether they are unreal on the strength of any evidence, as being so given in understanding or as not being given at all. First, the arguments or considerations employed in proving the ideas of time and space as inferential are no longer considered valid. We see that the ideas of time and space are not the result of sense perception, nor do they seem to be in the sphere of consciousness *before* other objects are apprehended. The muscular sense which is said to contribute to the inferential nature of this idea, is to be questioned, as not directly giving rise to any consciousness. To take

one by one—Is space itself to be considered as existing or as non-existing, real or unreal ? Is the idea of space necessary for the perception of duality, *i. e.* is it present before the notion of the duality can arise, either in respect of the subject or things external ? Or does it create duality which is no where ? If space be no other than the Knowing self, could or does it become the object of any such notion as implies or might imply its identical character with the subject ? In the first place, it would not do to say that the non-existent space induces any idea or notion. If, compelled by fear of inconsistency, we would not abandon the only ground under our feet viz., Thought, we must conceive space as something existing.

Now, what distinctions are suggested or are denoted by the terms *here* and *there*—how could they, or why should they, be unreal ? It is often supposed that space is indivisible, *i. e.*, something that has no parts, and therefore the divisions as *here* and *there* must be unreal. This view might be taken with reference to many other objects of knowledge ; however, the answer to the question of space would enable the thinker to find the solution in other cases as well. Is the

distinction of *here* and *there* to be admitted as unreal, because, it would otherwise make space other than what it is? Is space to be conceived as something having parts or no parts. The latter alternative cannot be adopted since it is inconceivable how such a thing could ever give occasion for the distinction as *here* and *there*. If a geometrical point could be conceived at any time to become expanded into the unlimited space, we could see that the expansion must be false and that the fancied distinctions are necessarily false too. On the other hand, the conception of the point precludes all such imagination, nor do we find anything to support any possible theory that space so evidently unlimited, might become contracted into a point or resolve itself into the knower or knowledge or into nothing.

Must space like the notion of space be absolutely identical with the thinking Self? Supposing that to be, we cannot see how the distinctions as *here* and *there* implied by the nature of such a self could be given up as unreal, for, the self at least must be real. Nothing could be admitted to be real if the properties that constitute it are not real, too. But, whatever may be the reality of the properties, it might be said

that that cannot warrant the assumption of separate entities real and absolute, which are indispensable only for the notion of duality or plurality. This objection is futile. The distinction in properties or aspects, however inseparable they may be, is sufficient to prove the main characteristic of knowledge always implying the relation of the Knower and the Known. Similarly, if the same characteristic of knowledge should invariably imply the distinction in properties or things which cannot be part and parcel of the thinking Self, these alone could not be rejected as unreal.

If the self, being essentially knowledge, pervade absolutely everything, whence is the necessity for it to indulge the notions of *here* and *there*. Perhaps, Ignorance or Nescience, might be brought in to account for the notion; but when the Self or the self knowledge is supposed to be all-pervading, or all-comprehensive, the nature, position and relation of that Ignorance cannot be consistently conceived or explained, and any explanation would necessitate the presupposition of time and space, which should thereby become doubly reassured as to their separate existence.

If any statement should be found in the Vedas conveying the absolute identity of time and space

with the thinking self, it must submit to the same examination, and is liable to the same objections. On the other hand such texts only forbid the supposition that the all-pervading Paramatman could become divided up or affected differently by anything or by any conditions, for instance, as some would have, really or falsely, by the Ignorance which infects the self—the Ignorance, Maya, or Avidya (positive or negative), which is supposed to explain away all notions of difference. Let us just see what the Chandyoga text VII-15 means. Substituting the word space for Brahman or Atman in the text, we shall have “Space alone is above, is below, is behind, before, to the right, to the left, Space is all this.” What should we consider to have been gained or lost by this process? Should we directly conclude that Brahman or self is space? How could that help us out of the difficulty of accounting for the distinction? If the Self is so pervading and is no other than Space, even the supposed Ignorance cannot help us in accounting for the notions of the Self as being *above*, *below*, etc. For the Ignorance itself has to be conceived in terms of Time or Space.

TIME AND SPACE.

Whatever be the nature of the Self, limited or unlimited, the notion of distinction as *here* and *there* in space cannot be explained, if space is not conceived as a real whole having parts. The idea of a whole is not inconsistent with the idea that it has parts. The idea of the parts of a whole does not require partitions of a foreign substance between the several parts, or even their separation from the whole and from each other. When the whole is so broken up and the pieces are separately presented, the idea of the whole and of the relation of the parts into that whole cannot always arise as when the whole is presented with all the parts intact. A wall between two rooms being itself in space, should it be on that account supposed incapable of forming the partition between the parts of space constituting the rooms? If it could not, we might say what cannot make a partition cannot enter into space i.e. cannot be in space. So we should arrive at the absurd conclusion that a wall cannot be in space. Whatever is observed to be in space is not observed to be also one with space unlimited and impartible. Further, if space could not be conceived to have parts, it might be asked whether things come to be in space, each

encompassing all at the same time. If it were so, we should not be able to think what resistance might be. On the other hand, limited bodies admitted as existing in space, and resisting each other cannot but prove that space has parts, which do not require to be cut asunder for the sake of that conception. The wall considered as a partition but indicates that the space it takes up is a part of space in general as distinguished from its parts to be conceived as rooms, or occupied by other limited bodies, or unoccupied side by side.

Thus, it is not possible to conceive that there is any item of correct understanding which identifies, by virtue of its own character, the knowing Self with space. Similarly, a more elaborate investigation would show the fallacious character of every position taken to prove Time to be identical with the Knowing self; and that only the assumption of the one absolute existence without a second, but not the force of evidence available, would compel us to endeavour after this identifying. Hence parts or aspects of an identical whole can be perceived as such, only when they are related in the whole. In the Spiritual Being the parts (aspects) are *ideally* separable, while in the Material, *physically* also.

Such considerations, due regard to knowledge, to evidence, to the principle of consistency and to the law of causation, have determined the view taken by Sri Madhwa in respect of Time and Space. He therefore tells us that Time and Space are two entities which are always and directly in the cognition of the knowing Self, and whenever other objects are perceived, the Self at once casts them into the mould of time and space ever present to it; and has shown all attempts to prove these notions as inferential to involve the process of begging the question or some other fallacy.

PERVERSION AND DIFFERENCE.

Does the character of the knowing Self require the eschewing of all notion of difference? It is supposed that the knowing Self is all-pervading and possibly nothing can be out of itself; should then the perception that things exist as distinct objects of knowledge, i.e., distinct from the knower and the knowledge, be unreal or incorrect? But as already shown with reference to space, the Self of all-pervasion could not in itself in any manner become affected by the existence of objects. Further the conception of pervasion itself would become more significant when there are things to be pervaded by the self. If the nature of self is

once granted to be capable of cognising itself or another, it would do so, whether what is cognized be an aspect of itself or anything distinct from itself, for that does not require what is perceived always to stand aloof from it or to be contained in itself. Even as space, the knowing Self if all-pervading need not become divided into unconnected pieces by the presence of different limited objects comprehended in itself. Now, in granting a Supreme Being or Paramatman, personal or impersonal, such omnipresence has to be granted for various reasons which we need not discuss here. In His case all that has been just now said of pervasion would be required to be admitted. But every knowing Self engaged in working out its own destiny cannot be proved as omnipresent, or as comprehending in itself all things given in its understanding.

Let us next suppose that *knowledge pervades* all objects; even then, why should they become part and parcel of knowledge. Certainly, the idea of pervasion does not necessitate the admission of identity between that which pervades and that which is pervaded, nor does the term comprehension help us in conceiving that what *comprehends* is necessarily identical with what is *comprehended*.

Therefore, there is no sallying out of this relativity and we should face the worst contradiction that could be conceived, if we should say that there is no relation in the relations perceived. Without adopting such an inconsistent position, we cannot make the statement or indulge in the notion that the related Knower and the Known are always one. Or if self-consciousness be granted, and if, in every act of knowing, the known is no other than Self, 'sleep' also must be a conscious state, as truly as *mukti*, or as the state of *Dhyana*.

THE INDIVIDUALITY OF THE SOUL.

Perceptions of pain and pleasure and of the identity of the suffering Self (the sufferer) under them—do they require the erasure of all distinctions ? That cannot be; for if pain, pleasure etc. should be merely verbal distinctions, there ought not to be distinct ideas; for when strictly synonymous words or terms are used, ideas are not different. Further, the avoidance of some and the seeking after of some others cannot but imply intrinsic difference between the two sets of things. Suppose each term describes the Self and nothing but Self in a particular aspect, even then, the distinctions cannot become merely verbal.

The several senses are differently affected by different objects and the notions of pleasure and pain are realised as different and as being caused by different objects or circumstances, at different times, in different individuals, in different degrees of intensity. An easy explanation of these seems to be found in calling them appearances. But if it were possible to find indisputable evidence that all appearances are absolutely baseless, the absolute oneness of all might somehow be postulated. On the other hand, the appearances, changing as they may be, primarily claim the recognition of their being connected, intimately too, with some basis. The changes or appearances are at the same time different in different things, pertinently suggesting a difference in their bases or causes. But the oneness of basis could be thought of, only when the differences are fancifully or dogmatically set aside. Or, if they should all be supposed to be the essence of one self, the distinctions must always be as true as the very self and these cannot be accounted for except by admitting self-consciousness and different aspects in the self—which is, of course, incompatible with the theory of oneness, since that consciousness might become the evidence of other existences. Perhaps,

this insuperable difficulty has led to the assumption of a Knowledge which is to be unconnected with the knower and the known. Anyhow, the notion that implies a knowing of the world outside the self should be left without a consistent explanation.

Further the self has no necessity of knowing itself either, for it cannot when pure, since it has no aspects of its own and it should not become the *agent* of perceiving; or when conditioned, the conditions cannot be supposed in any manner to interfere with the self and confer on it the virtue of perceiving, since the nature of the self is unassailable (*Asanga*), and only these conditions might be said to perceive, or act in any manner towards, not the self, but something else *which is not*. It is, therefore, unintelligible to say that the self *knows* nothing but itself *in knowing the world*. Moreover, no perception is seen naturally to arise as "I know the world which is not." Therefore, to start with the assumption that the distinctions do not exist, and, for the purpose of proving it, to assume another entity of which existence cannot be consistently predicated in any admissible sense, are not agreeable to Sri Padarayana and to Sri Madhwa, who are therefore found to adhere to

the older philosophical view as conveyed in the heart of the Rigveda. Now that the varied experiences emphatically show in the light of admissible knowledge that the spiritual beings in the several bodies are finite, and each has to work separately for its own development and towards the final goal, the authorities may be received with satisfaction, especially when, as shown above, the truth of difference between soul and soul is perceived to be more than a probability. All the foregoing discussions are but preliminary just to indicate how Sri Madhwa was forced to differ from the views of his predecessors. Since a more elaborate presentation of his reasons for the difference is beyond the scope of this sketch, we may directly pass on to his philosophical analysis both of the moral and physical world.

THE AIM OF PHILOSOPHY.

The philosophical enquiries always set about investigating the highest purpose to be attained by man, by all those in whom such a wish is implanted. The presumption has been that man is in a state of misery or change, and all endeavours must tend to his rising out of it. The possibility of realising that end depends upon a thorough understanding of the causes and the

laws governing this undesirable state. Perhaps, in despair of an escape from it in any other manner, we seem to be hopeful of it by supposing the very condition to be unreal. To Sri Madhwa this appears no solution at all and the investigation pointing to such a conclusion appears bootless-trouble. On the other hand, the experiences of the world are as irrefutable facts as their causes must be. The different conditions of man must therefore be looked upon as different combinations either of causes or effects. If particular combinations have tended to this miserable state, an analysis or unravelling of this complex condition, restoring the several elements to their original condition, or instituting a different set of combinations must tend to a different state. Taking this position we can see that the Being that thirsts after realisation of a better state can possibly have it and that that attainment alone can be the sensible end of man. Accordingly Sri Madhwa sees the fitness of, and finds reasons for, starting with the proposition that the world is real, and its wise and good Ruler is a Reality of all excellence and powers. Therefore a true understanding of the world and its Author, and of their true relations, he says, gradually leads to the direct cog-

nition of the Lord and His Grace towards the desired Salvation.

CATEGORIES OF THE SYSTEM.

Philosophers endeavour to analyse the whole world of things or phenomena into convenient groups for the purposes of understanding and explanation. Kanada divides it into six or seven groups of *things* in the most comprehensive sense, and Gotama divides the phenomena in their subjective aspect into sixteen groups for the purpose of testing truths so far as they may be embodied in language, the exponent of thought. Other philosophers also have their own divisions. But Sri Madhwa has, with reference to the genuine authorities and accurate observation, grouped them under these ten heads or categories :—1. substance, 2. quality, 3. action, 4. community, 5. speciality or particularity, 6. the specified (*Visishta*) 7. the whole (*Amsi*) 8. latent power (*Sakti*) 9. similarity 10. non-existence or (*abhava*). (*Vide* author's treatise on the categories of Madhwa's system.)

Such a classification is apparently necessary for the understanding of the relations, how they were brought about, how and how far they can be changed or brought to an end. Primarily the

scientific process of study is analysis, and it starts with our understanding. An idea of *what is not*, *was not*, and *will not be at any time*, is yet possible to have, and it is necessary in contradistinction to the idea, *what is, was or will be*. That idea, we must admit, is called forth by some force of imagination, however formless, vague and indefinite the representation may be. Sometime, it may be called forth by the use of language which has no reference to any fact or object that has a being. Without such a vague conception at least of absolute non-being, there could be no denying it either. The Acharya's insight into this feature of understanding must clearly show that the most fundamental principle involved in it is always kept in view. At the same time he requires the thinker to remember that facts alone have attraction for him, and facts and fancies should never be confounded. Secondly the Acharya's thoughts on the knotty problem of external perception or theory of vision and his deference to the law of causation promise and admit a basis to the human understanding which must stand firm as long as a true conception of knowledge may guide man safely out of the meshes woven by the same faculty when corrupt.

MATTER OR PHYSICAL SUBSTANCE.

Starting with this principle he tells us that the different properties and characteristics or tendencies of mutually exclusive nature, abstractions as they may in themselves be, do point to difference in substances, gross or subtle, wherein they must rest. For instance, let us take all unintelligent matter to be one kind of substance. If that were absolutely homogeneous and every portion of it absolutely like any other portion in all respects it would be difficult consistently to explain the very many and different phenomena. The explanation sought to be given by the combination in different proportions or by the differently acting force working upon it, cannot succeed so long as the principle is assumed to be the one absolute substance *absolutely homogeneous*. On the other hand, different principles or even particulars may have such prevailing kindred nature as may be fit to be considered under one class forming a practically homogeneous heap or mass. That is to say, the classification or assortment into one group or class does not necessitate the recognition of a substance *in general* to be absolutely identical either in quantity or quality, except perhaps by a forced thought or forced expression or by regarding things

to be such under peculiar conditions or light; under such conditions imagined or instituted by us they might exhibit a similar form of virtue, but this cannot prove that their differentiating virtues are not at all. Hence *prakriti* or unintelligent matter, (which is the physical matter of the modern or the materialistic science, fit to be weighed or analysed, or treated in ever so many ways), which in conjunction with a force or forces may variously fall into combinations of its own constituent principles and according to proportions yield different and useful products, is philosophically and logically conceived to be *one*, i.e., *one kind* of substance, from the ruling common characteristic of *being subject to modification*. When this is thus found to be one distinct nature, another by virtue of what the same understanding implies must be admitted as exhibiting a different set of characteristics. The mental and moral phenomena refuse to be resolved into that modifiable ponderous physical substance; for, supposing for a moment that they could be so resolved, it would then be the absolute annihilation or denial of the mental and moral nature as having really no causal or germinal existence. The difficulty of taking up such a position being so evident, some have found it easier

and more agreeable to hold that all physical matter or phenomena, if at all, exist only in idea and might be resolved into idea, which, must however, ultimately stand unrelated. Thus the two views are mutually exclusive, though both the sides appear to be in actual combination, and hence, in observation too.

THE THREE ENTITIES.

Now the view propounded by Sri Madhva, partially recognised by some others also, comes in apparently as a conciliation of both, but diametrically opposed to either. The physical matter cannot be essentially resolved into the mind or fully accounted for by the mental and moral phenomena, while these essentially refuse to be the physical matter, or merely its modes or its properties. The relation of related things does not require such unification while it is the full evidence of itself, viz., the relation between things of different natures each acting and re-acting on the other and still capable of being liberated in some cases from such operation wholly or to the desirable extent. The light brought into a dark room becomes the evidence not only of the presence of any dull substance, but of its own presence as well. Such cogent considerations lie at the

foundation of the system taught by Sri Madhwa. Accordingly the whole universe presented to his thought divides itself into two main groups viz., *the intelligent* and *the unintelligent*. The former furnishes the motive force necessary for the changes or the modifications in the latter, and as such it is capable of acting with absolute or limited force with regard to *that* physical matter.

Now the *Supreme Intelligence* of absolutely independent activity is the Supreme Being that, unconditioned, rules all the rest that is conditioned. Though it is placed logically in the first group it should not be considered as equal to, or one with, any other particular of that group* for the very reason that we have to grant *that* to be the *one absolute*, and the others to be limited or finite. In spite of the similarity in respect of being intelligent, the recognition of this broad gulf of difference between *that one* and other particulars of the class cannot affect the dignity of philosophical conceptions. From the importance of the Supreme Intelligence, the absolute source of force, it is separately considered as the one inde-

* *Vide* Introduction to the translations of Purna Pragna to Darsana, and Tattva Sankhyana.

pendent existence, not in itself conditioned but wisely conditioning or limiting other existences. The entities thus recognised in this system are three viz., 1. the Independent Intelligence, 2. the dependent intelligences, 3. the unintelligent. The ten categories already enumerated comprehend these three and their relations. * The Bhagavad Gita directly supports this threefold classification of eternal truths or entities.

THE NATURE OF THE ENTITIES.

I. The Supreme Intelligence or Brahman is unlimited by time, space, qualities and powers, and hence independent. II. The limited intelligences are unlimited in time, but limited in all other respects and hence they are wholly dependent upon Brahman who, in His infinite wisdom, best knows how to guide them and help them in working out their destiny. Now the difference recognised between individuals must lead to its logical consequences. The impulses of moral nature are not essentially the same in all. Otherwise the activities different in various individuals at the same time cannot be satisfactorily explained, the body or vesture cannot be said to account

* Vide Chapter XV. and Introduction to the Author's Translation.

for them ; for the body is guided and used by the indweller, and, for his use in a particular manner it is made suitable. These impulses or tendencies are, being the very essence, not to be eradicated and superseded by others ; on the other hand, they severally develop to an absolute perfection in the several individuals—a development which determines the final goal of each (vide-Gita). These impulses or tendencies are of three kinds as *Satvika*, *Rajas* and *Tamasa*. The *Satva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* are three principles constituting *Prakriti*, corresponding to those tendencies and becoming the instrument or basis for working out the Soul's nature. They appear to actuate different individuals and may be popularly described as good, evil, and good and evil mixed. These cannot be thought of as depending upon any causes or circumstances that have no real or permanent connection with the eternal beings. They cannot be said to arise out of the material bodies with which beings are endowed ; on the other hand, the bodies are given to each suitably to the tendencies in it. Therefore the question cannot but lead us to recognizing that the source of the tendencies is in the essential nature of the intelligent being itself.

III. Also, the *unintelligent Matter* is essentially unlimited in time. But it is capable of being modified and cut into pieces, and the Acharya states that the ordinary notion of an atom is only crude, and even that atom may, if provided with such subtle means, be divided into still finer parts, perhaps till we come to something like a geometrical point ; even such a point has, in his view, aspects when considered relatively to the various lines that may pass through, or drawn to, or from it. He would, therefore, tell us that in the space of an atom there may be infinities of living existences. This entity, regarded as one homogeneous mass of substance, is described, with due regard to the law of causation, as constituted of a number of subtle principles all agreeing in this respect that they are modifiable. When these principles are taken in different proportions, the gross forms of matter in different stages are produced with different virtues or properties according as this or that principle predominates. The combinations are brought about {by the will and command of the Supreme Intelligence, of course, not blind of any purpose. They are produced evidently to serve, not any purpose of *that Matter* or the principles constituting it—(hence it is called.

unintelligent, for the intelligent alone can be said to have a purpose), but the purposes to be achieved by the limited intelligence. Various questions affecting the law, progress and the ultimate goal of the life in observation may be consistently answered when a clear and sufficiently deep insight is had into the nature of these three entities, even as assumptions for speculation.

One great feature of the aforesaid analysis is the endeavour to emphasise the distinction between the changeable and the unchangeable. It is the former that is the basis of all the phenomena, appearing and disappearing, and also reappearing, having a transitory life against the fond wishes of the intelligent being who apparently is the sport of them all and would have all agreeable phenomena alone perpetuated without a change or interruption. This circumstance has been used in the Brahma Sutra to prove the dependent character of the limited intelligence. Thus a grand purpose is read through the changes that are produced to, and withdrawn from, the view of the jiva. When thus the principle of essential distinction is recognised between the entities, the Evolution

cannot be considered to have any particular value with reference to that Matter alone. Though this matter and the spiritual essence cannot become mixed up into a substance of one nature or of a third nature, still Matter does exist only for the uses of the other, and hence the states of its gross evolution are intended to contribute to the subtle evolution of the light of understanding in the spiritual being whose essence does not thereby become modified. If then the course of evolution in Matter should depend upon the course that has to be passed through by the spiritual being, and if the latter course should be regulated by the peculiarities resting in the *jīva* and consequently the line appointed by the guiding Omniscience, the course of Evolution cannot, and need not, be as perfectly straight and advancing only onwards as we would have it. The principle being to give the spiritual entity all those experiences that may give the development necessary for the attainment and the intelligent and intelligible realisation of the final goal, and as it is to be reached severally by those beings, the law of Evolution should be taken to work as modified by *Karma*, which necessarily works in a zigzag course.

KNOWLEDGE SENSUOUS AND NON-SENSUOUS.

The intelligent being must, by virtue of its own essence, know certain things directly either its own aspects or other objects ever present to it. That is to say, it has non-sensuous knowledge. When we have called it limited intelligence, the non-sensuous knowledge it has, though very necessary, cannot be very considerable; nor should the mistake be made that it possesses all the required knowledge either; on the other hand it has essentially the faculty to extend within certain limits the sphere of its understanding by the experiences which the conditions are intended to bring about. The non-sensuous knowledge is called *sakshi gnana* and the Self constitutes by itself the faculty of *perceiving directly*, and hence it is *sakshin*. The words *sakshi* is so explained by Panini. It is not to be taken to mean one that looks on with indifference or unaffected by what is perceived. By this virtue the individual Self realises all that is conveyed to it by the senses and other organs. Having regard to this source the knowledge so gained is called *Vrittignana* or experiential knowledge. In the case of embodied souls both kinds of knowledge are observed to be. But

the former is "always true and the latter may or may not be. So when two perceptions arise successively with reference to the same thing the *sakshi* or the soul sits in judgment upon them. The details of non-sensuous knowledge lie dormant in the case of many souls, and in fact their attention is more strongly drawn to sensuous presentations. This state of the soul is described as *samsarabandha*; for while in that condition the soul happens to be engrossed with the passing circumstances made sufficiently attractive, why, in an over-powering degree, though not, after all, without a purpose even therein. That is, 'the *jiva* is, in the long run, expected to discover how forgetful he has been of his own nature and of the Lord and other things of permanent and absolute interest, which he could realise only by contrast, and by the disgust and dissatisfaction he must feel and develop towards them.

SAMSARA OR BONDAGE.

The bondage or the evident limitation by a body or bodies which appear to be the impediment to such realisation is by some regarded as only seeming or unreal; it is said that the unreal seems to be real through Ignorance, against which difficulties have been already raised; for they hold that,

being unreal, the bondage can possibly vanish when the veil of Ignorance is raised. But this purposeless unreality at any point or in any manner investing a boundless unknowable Reality does not commend itself to Sri Madhwa. With the data already described, he thinks that the limited intelligences are in real bondage, since they are eternal and ever capable of some essential perception, desire, and activity, which differ in each both in kind and degree, and they are, therefore, naturally invested like unto a seed with an appropriate husk of a *lingasareera*, that is a subtle body of *prakriti*, which is a reality distinct from the essence of the Intelligent being. When it is said that the bondage is real, it does not mean it is the essential nature of the being. That is a view rather necessitated by the starting assumption that there is but one Reality without a second. As already shown the very limited character of the soul's essential nature is sufficient to explain how it becomes subjected to other real conditions useful in working towards a goal of its own. Then the Lord in His perfect wisdom, not according to our wisdom agreeable to our desires and wishes, institutes those real conditions of bondage; He also raises us from their midst when the

evolution of our nature is complete. Thus the responsibility which the moral being must bear is not merely phenomenal, but has a firm basis and significance, though not generally perceived by us—(*vide* author's summary of the 18th chapter of the Gita).

KARMA AND KNOWLEDGE.

When the essential nature of workers and their conditions are thus conceived to be real, it is easy to see that they have to do Karma, that is, to work so as to gain that knowledge which should engender devotion to and secure the grace of Brahman. Directly from this position it is clearly seen that the prescribed Karma is the means of the required knowledge which in its turn purified and exalted by devotion is the immediate and most important step towards the goal. Hence knowledge is superior to Karma but they are not antagonistic, which might appear to be the case under some confusion of ideas.

The Karma spoken of in the foregoing paragraph is a means to knowledge enjoined upon the worker and as such it consists of duties that one should necessarily perform. Again Karma is often spoken of as the cause of the mundane bondage. This Karma literally means what one does, i.e.,

activity in general. All activities not prompted by the wish of delighting the Lord and of obtaining His grace, do produce some consequence or other, and the *jivas* are bound to abide by it (*vide Gita*). The Intelligent being is essentially characterised by knowledge or the faculty of knowing, will, and self-directed activity, and as such he cannot at any moment cease to be active. Then it is clear that the direction given to the activity makes it either a source of strengthening the mundane bondage, or of knowledge leading to liberation.

GODHEAD.

*It has been already described as being unlimited in all respects, i.e., it is absolute. By some it is held that the "Absolute" is *unknowable* *indescribable*, *destitute of attributes*, of all *peculiarities*, is *purely impersonal*, manifests itself into many by means of conditions. But the Acharya points out that the very idea of "Absolute" is as relative as any other idea, relative to the idea of "the conditioned," and however vague this idea may be, it is still knowing the "Absolute;" that is to say, the Absolute is not absolutely unknowable; certainly it is unknowable in the sense it is not wholly and*

-exhaustively known, and as for that matter, this sort of unknowableness is to be admitted with reference to the commonest things claimed to be wholly within the range of our knowledge. Similarly it is indescribable inasmuch as it is not exhaustively described in language; it is destitute of qualities viz., *Satwa, Rajas, Tamas*, but not of the infinite attributes of infinite excellence nor of peculiarities, since every idea distinguishing Brahman from other things implies a characteristic of the Absolute.

'The statement that Brahman is indescribable etc., however, proceeds from the absence of thorough comprehension of Brahman. "The wise see the form of (the Mount) Meru and still do not see it (for they cannot see all over, in and out). (Similarly) it (Brahman) cannot be described, reasoned out, and known (entirely as such and such). So the Garuda Purana says, "For want of thorough comprehension, Brahman though declared by the whole body of Scriptures and capable of being known and inferred by reasoning, is said to be beyond the reach of words, reasoning and knowledge" (Purna Pragna Darsa (page 14).

ABSOLUTE IS NOT UNKNOWNABLE.

When the eye sees a huge object having colour, neither that eye nor the mind acting with it is observed to limit or reduce the dimensions of the object. Similarly, to think of Godhead as possessing attributes cannot in any manner limit or reduce it. A small mirror which may bear the image of a much larger object yet representing an unmistakable likeness of the whole does not thereby make the object be of lesser dimensions ; nor does it require the object to enter into it that it might bear the image. So when our senses are brought in relation to objects there is no necessity for these to enter into either the senses or the mind, though indisputably the perception of objects arises in the mind which has no dimensions. Whether it is the mind, a faculty of the material vesture, or it is the intelligent self, that perceives, the object is not required to enter into them ; hence it is properly the *object*. On the same line of reasoning, we can see that all the means of knowledge at our command may give us the necessary perception of the Absolute without in any manner affecting its absoluteness, since we are related to it without in any manner interrupting its character. By the way, it may also be noted that

the Acharya holds that if the Absolute could not be directly described by any word, no word could possibly indicate it even by way of suggestion; for when it is again questioned 'what is the thing that is suggested by any word?', the answer must finally be given in words which at least must directly describe Him. What is describable is certainly knowable, no matter to what extent it may be, while the sufficiency of the possible extent is attested by the practical end accomplished.

If all the Vedas do not exhaustively describe Brahman or the Absolute, it is described by them all so far as they go. Sri Madhwacharya has shown in his commentary of the first Adhyaya of the *Vedanta Sutras* and in *Karmanirnaya* how all the sentences, words, syllables and sounds declare the excellence and perfectness of the Absolute. Such Brahman cannot be sensibly supposed to become, really or otherwise, conditioned by anything else or in any manner.

INCARNATION.

The idea of incarnation is one of much abuse and in fact it is incompatible with the nature of the Supreme Being. Whenever He appears as one among His creatures for the purpose of guiding

them, He seems to them as one in flesh and blood. But under no circumstances He assumes or has the necessity to assume, such a body as conditions the little *jiva*. It is not a matter of serious difficulty for realisation that the Lord of unbounded powers can show Himself in such *forms* as are familiar to men. Sri Madhwa repeatedly points out that no *prakrita deha* i.e., a material body is put on by the Lord. To be conditioned by the material body and to be present in all bodies as the omnipresent Lord are two different things. On the other hand the *jiva* who is imprisoned as it were in the material body might be said to have incarnations though involuntarily. When the essential and eternal difference is made out between the Lord and the souls, the question of incarnation has altogether a different bearing in the teachings of Sri Madhwa. Accordingly all the statements in the Gita are explained in this light and supported by a proper interpretation of the Rik *Purnamidam* (Br. v. i. 1) "That is whole, this is whole, from the whole issues the whole, the whole being taken away from the whole, (still) the whole remains." Thus the unconditioned nature of Brabman is declared, whether He is the Whole pervading all space and time or

appears to us in a human form or actuates us enthroned in our hearts.

PERSONALITY OF GOD.

If the term "Impersonal" means "of unlimited nature in all respects," Brahman is Impersonal. He is also personal, for He is not a mere lifeless abstraction, nor a formless mass of some substance. True, His infinite Personality we cannot even conceive. But by virtue of His unbounded powers and out of His pure grace towards us, He may show Himself as a finite Personality, but He does not on that account become finite in any respect or degree. (*vide Purusha Sukta and Vedanta Sutras III. ii. 23 to 27*). Even when He so appears, He does not assume material bodies, though we are dull enough to mistake His Personality as finite, or as consisting of flesh and blood, to which alone our eyes are habituated. He is essentially all knowledge, all-bliss. So the Highest Brahman is directly the Iswara, unsubdued or unveiled by Maya, the Ruler of the world and all. It is He who agitates the unintelligent matter, causes the subtle constituent principles thereof to combine in various proportions and to produce various gross effects, which become the conditions with which the souls.

have to work towards their destiny. Since *jivas* must work and the products of matter must furnish them with conditions under the guidance of the Lord, this gross perceptible universe is seen to develop from the subtle principles of the unintelligent matter when worked up by the guiding activity of the Lord and the necessary activity of *jivas*.

THE MEANS OF SALVATION.

When thus the nature of Brahman, and of the limited Intelligent being is truly perceived and when there is a necessity felt on the part of the latter for working towards a high purpose viz., that of realising, as fully as possible, their own nature and that of the Lord, and thereby attaining to a state of blessedness, emerging from a life of sleepy dullness and darkness, the *jivas* naturally look for the means of attainment, which is called *sadhana*. The subject is clearly treated of in the third Adhyaya of the Purna Pragna Darsana and its introduction. To state briefly, renunciation, devotion, direct cognition of the Lord by contemplation are the only means leading to *mukti*. A correct knowledge of all things gross and subtle by enquiry and the qualification of intrinsic devotion tend to that course of contemplation.

An inborn devotion to the Lord, a just study of the Vedas, control of the senses, the eschewing of pleasures, indifference to hopes and fears, the perception of the futility and the perishable character of all things below, a thorough resignation to the feet of the Lord are the first qualifications of those that are eligible to work towards direct cognition. The knowledge to be gained by enquiry must have pre-eminently reference to these points:—(1) The five relations of ineffaceable difference: (a) The Lord is distinct from the limited intelligence. (b) The Lord is distinct from the unintelligent matter. (c) One *jiva* is distinct from another. (d) *Jivas* are distinct from Matter. (e) When Matter is divided, the pieces are distinct from one another. (2) The graduated rank of all the finite beings. (3) The conclusive perception, by ascending up the ladder of gradation, of the Supreme Being as one far, far above, and as the Independent and Gracious Ruler of these all.

INELIGIBLE JIVAS.

Besides the recognition of entities more than one and the aforesaid gradation, there is a third article of faith which fills thinkers with unqualified horror; it is the question of

eternal damnation, or of some *jivas* being ineligible for the blissful state in salvation. This point really requires a separate treatise for elucidation, since it is a view opposed to the sentimental world or to systems dignified as only gratifying *that* sentiment, and the Acharya's view has been represented as having originated in his own sentiment. However the general reader may, for a moment, see the justification of the view by thinking that all the evil tendencies and the mixed tendencies of good and evil are respectively condemned to suffer eternal damnation or to be ever tossed only in the mundane life. If these tendencies should ever be perceived and happen to be as some concrete individuals of immutable character, no better destiny could then await them. Taking such a view, Sri Madhwa classifies into three groups the *jivas* who are such concrete intelligent and yet immutable tendencies; for in the Acharya's system, there is no abstract attribute standing apart from some substance or substratum implied by the notion, no substance destitute of some attribute, and there is nothing more perceived of the substance than the group of attributes presented to the understanding (*vide* Sudha under Vedanta sutras III-ii-28).

But the *Jiva* of each class works with his own appropriate conditions and becomes developed to ripeness in his own tendency and thus reaches the destiny to be realised by virtue of his essential nature.

THE FINAL STATE.

When the *jivas* attain *mukti* they do not and need not become one with the Lord nor equal to Him, or to one another among themselves,—which was not before, for the perfection attained by each *jiva* is duly his own, which does not savour of any sense of dissatisfaction or jealousy—a point elucidated by Sri Badarayana in the Sutra (III-iii—34).

SATTA.

But the gradation (inequality) among the released does not become the cause of variance (jealousy, etc.,) between them, because they have their mind set on (Brahman) the Imperishable, and are all equal (in being free from defects); and (the inferiors) are indebted to the superiors, as the pupil (is to the master.)

BHASHYA.

“From the absence of equality betwixt the released (in heaven) variance (jealousy etc.,) does not arise between them ; for all have attained to

the direct knowledge of Brahman, and are free from defects or shortcomings, in which respect they are equal; and there is the grace of the superiors to which the souls of lower grades are indebted. This may be illustrated by the case of the pupil who has betaken himself to the preceptor (that leads him to Brahman). All this is said in the Tura Sruti, "The classes of souls in the world of bliss are various and of various grades. But they are not at variance (with each other); for they all know Brahman, and are free from faults; even in the world (mere) inequality of rank does not become the cause of variance (discontent, etc.) as (observed) in the relation of the master and the pupil, etc.; then whence could there be any cause of difference among those that have after release attained to real wisdom?"

The *jivas* having within their appropriate limits endeavoured and attained a direct perception of the Lord and His Grace enter into the state of heavenly bliss generally along with *Chaturmukha* who is the final Preceptor of all. The heavenly state is not a mere absence or forgetfulness of miseries, but it is a state of positive intelligible, Blissfulness; for, their own pure spiritual nature

and the presence of the blissful Lord ever enjoyed in unfading freshness can really make them blessed through eternity.

THE CHIEF IDEAS RECAPITULATED.

From the foregoing meagre sketch it may be seen that (1) in this system a special significance is attached to *Purushartha* the chief good, which the Intelligent being thirsts after to attain ; (2) the means with which we are endowed and are working are not naturally discredited ; (3) that everything concrete or abstract proved to be truth or proved inherent in the truth has a real value and purpose, (4) that Knowledge essential and experiential are both useful attributes of the limited Intelligent being (5) that the senses in their normal and sound condition and the Eternal Testimony consistently interpreted are the sources of all reliable knowledge ; (6) that the limitations of knowledge in the finite *jiva* is no impediment to obtaining a true perception of the Absolute to the necessary extent (7) that the attributes of the Absolute are as absolute as itself and are essentially the same so as not to become its limitations in any manner ; (8) that difference or distinctness is a characteristic of

everything, since anything that is perceived is perceived to be distinct from everything, either generally or specially ; (9) that the property of *Particularity* enables us to abstract the various aspects of one and the same thing and to speak of them as separate things while the identity of the thing is not interfered with ; (10) that on the strength of the only reliable evidence vouchsafed to us absolute identity of all that appear different ceases to be acceptable ; (11) that the three kinds of entities are the least to which all the phenomena can possibly be reduced, and they cannot be fewer to afford a consistent explanation ; and (12) that the philosophical dignity of oneness of all is questioned on the strength of evidence as tested by logic, and, inspite of various analogies and grand scientific enquiries, that oneness hoped for in the end would only stand in inexplicable destitution of purpose, either in the beginning or at the conclusion. Only such of the points have been touched upon as are necessary for the general reader to have a clear idea of the distinctive character of Sri Madhwa's philosophical views. Many more points of special interest to a philosophical thinker or those necessary for showing the strength of the system to full advantage, or logical

interpretations of the Upanishad passages seeming to contradict Sri Madhwa's views are beyond the scope of this sketch.

More than any other, the one feature that has been brought out is Sri Madhwa's contention that the validity of sense experience cannot be totally impeached and the Srutis cannot be interpreted as contradicting either that experience or any psychological law, that no transcendental positions contradicting them can be admissible. The realistic view of the phenomenal world as well as of its positive causes expressed in the Rigveda (vide Mandalas II to VII) and the condemnation of the opposite view in the Bhagavad Gita (chap. xvi-8 &c.) afford an enormous strength to his psychological data. He tells us that in the particulars of a class the points of community in one are not identical with those in another, but they are only two sets like each other. The points of difference equally form the essence of each individual and thus the full contents of a particular comprise both the points of community and those of difference. If those are real, no reason can be seen why these alone should be thought unreal. Both being equally real as the essence of the thing, he cannot see that mere difference in the

essential nature between one and another could become the source of misery or defect.

The cause of misery must be found in the peculiarities of each *jiva*, or in some circumstances such as passions, all culminating in some ignorance or misapprehension, which cannot with any propriety be supposed to limit the Unlimited Intelligence, from which on the other hand, the limited intelligence cannot without help rise to the realisation of a better and ever blessed state. Accordingly the *Sutrakara* has shown how the gradation or difference does not in any manner mar the sense of perfect blessedness of the *jivas* in the heavenly kingdom. Similarly the *gunas* known as *Salva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas* are those to be eschewed, but not the qualities (*i.e.*, the properties) of wisdom, nobility, power and such excellent and essential attributes which make the individual; for these cannot go at all. This is absolutely true of the Lord whom the *gunas* of *prakriti* could never assail. In fine the theory of Sri Madhwa comes forward to exhibit the truth on the basis that the causes of our moral aspirations are absolutely real; those conscious aspirations are equally real; and the realisation of those aspirations must be and is a gloriously absolute and

conscious reality—a position which alone he thinks confers true dignity on a philosophical view. It must be edifying to our understanding to conclude that the religious and moral laws should, if at all, commend themselves for acceptance as resting upon such a background of philosophical positions full of consistent promise. In conclusion, we shall, with Sri Madhwa always praise the perfectly good and wise Lord and pray for a flood of light which will ever discover the pure and simple truth to our limited yet unbewildered sense.

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